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Abstract 
 
In the past six years, tremendous growth in the size and popularity of social networking has 
fundamentally changed the way we use the Internet. As social aspects to the Internet continue to 
expand in both quantity and scope, security of the users of social networking sites and the data 
generated by them will ultimately become an unavoidable concern. This is a realization that malicious 
users have already had, as viruses, spyware, and phishing scams continue to propagate through social 
networks at an alarming rate. It is now becoming increasingly critical that the average user also 
understands this potential for the exploitation of trust among the social networking community. Yet, the 
security industry has been slow to respond in the act of providing adequate tools for protecting the 
user. 
 
This thesis describes the development of a proof-of-concept application that uses social networking data 
to aid in the detection of malicious web content as it propagates through the user’s network. While this 
methodology certainly has its limitations, including user impersonation and false positive rates, the 
results of testing this application against known phishing and malware sites with real-world user profiles 
have shown surprisingly positive results.  
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1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
In the past six years, the tremendous growth in both the size and popularity of social networking sites, 
such as MySpace1 and, most recently, Twitter2, have allowed people all over the globe to virtually 
connect, communicate, and share their lives with one another [14, 39]. Of the many examples of these 
sites, one of the most popular is Facebook3—an online community of which at least 85% of college 
undergraduates in the United States are a part of [38+. In fact, since it was founded in 2004, Facebook’s 
user base has grown to a staggering 400 million people from countries throughout the world [18]. 
Unfortunately, the proliferation of computer malware, such as viruses and phishing attacks, has also 
continued to rise in this same span of time [44]. As a result, malicious users and virus writers have found 
a natural progression between using traditional Internet technologies, such as web browsing and email, 
and exploiting the inherent trust and size of social networks to help spread their attacks [21].  
 
One of the most famous examples of this new breed of attacks is the Koobface virus, which has plagued 
users of both Facebook and MySpace. Essentially, the Koobface virus spreads through hyperlinks that 
appear to come from one of your friends, usually advertising a funny video. When the victim clicks the 
link to watch the video, they are met with a pop-up message stating that they need to update their 
Adobe Flash player. When the user clicks to download the “update”, they are actually downloading a 
Trojan horse which installs both a web proxy and a backdoor on the victim’s system. At this point, the 
virus masquerades as the victim and continues to replicate itself throughout the victim’s social network 
[21]. The reason that the Koobface virus has been so successful in spreading is simply because of the 
inherent level of trust that users put into their use of social networks. Since the links appear to come 
                                                          
1
 http://www.myspace.com 
2
 http://twitter.com/ 
3
 http://www.facebook.com 
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from their friends, most users will click them and download the virus without ever stopping to consider 
the consequences of their actions. 
 
1.1.1 Traditional Techniques 
In an attempt to combat this problem, computer security researchers have developed tools and 
techniques to help users identify and avoid malicious content. Static methods, such as blacklists, often 
have a tremendous success rate when it comes to identifying attacks, though they are often difficult to 
maintain due to the short lifespan of malware and phishing sites [6, 24, 43, 44]. Dynamic detection 
methods avoid this problem by allowing the computer and/or browser to make a real-time decision 
about the site’s intent based on attributes such as the server’s geographic location, domain name, or 
offered content [6, 19, 42, 43, 44]. Yet, these methods are not without their own shortcomings as 
accuracy often becomes a concern. In addition, malware authors are able to design attacks that 
circumvent these analysis methods, thus rendering the tools essentially useless [6]. 
 
1.1.2 Using Social Networks 
While several projects have been successful in the area of malware and fraud detection, including 
examples such as CANTINA, Netcraft, and SpoofGuard, none to date have utilized the tremendous 
wealth of information found in social networks [6, 28, 43, 44]. The work of this thesis seeks to change 
this by creating a Facebook application that uses a person’s social network to help make a more 
educated decision about the presence or lack of malicious intent in web content that they are exposed 
to. Examples of the information that can be garnered from the Facebook databases that would be useful 
in this application are such statistics as the online identity of someone who sends you a link, the number 
of mutual friends you have with that sender, and the type of online interactions you have had with that 
person [17]. In addition, careful analysis of the data made available to a Facebook application can garner 
other useful information, such as how often a user tends to see messages from the sender. The 
underlying theory behind this approach is that a link that is sent to you by someone you talk often with, 
or have many mutual contacts with, is much less likely to be malicious than a link you receive from 
someone you rarely talk to or who is at the far reaches of your social network. 
 
The inclusion of this information in malware detection techniques is a radically different approach than 
some of the more classic methods because it seeks to essentially customize the decision process to each 
individual user in the way that it uses personalized data as decision criteria. As a result, it should be 
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much more difficult to bypass an application of this type because an attacker would first need to enter a 
user’s social network and gain the trust of the victim, not to mention some of the victim’s friends, in 
order to effectively fool the detection process. All of this must be done in a period of time that is short 
enough to avoid detection by the site’s administrators or the victim, which would likely prompt an 
account lockout or password change. 
 
1.2 The Facebook Environment 
For the purposes of this thesis, Facebook was chosen as the proof-of-concept platform for a variety of 
reasons. One of these reasons is that the easily accessible API and support for third party applications 
makes it possible to obtain so much of the data that is critical to the success of this concept. In addition, 
the user base of Facebook provides an undeniable opportunity to reach large sets of data that would 
otherwise be unavailable from some of the less popular social networking sites.  
  
While 400 million people is an enormous user base, especially when compared to other popular sites 
like Digg and YouTube that have a reported 40 million and 24 million users respectively, it is not 
appropriate to assume readers have a detailed understanding of the Facebook environment [1, 7]. Thus, 
the following section will give a brief overview of the site and its features. 
 
1.2.1 The Profile 
When a user creates a Facebook account they are asked to setup their profile page, which will contain 
all of the information they want to present about themselves to other users. An example of a typical 
user profile is shown in Figure 1.1. The user’s profile often contains some basic information, such as 
name, gender, hometown, and contact details. However, some users choose to be surprisingly 
indiscriminate in both the type and amount of personal information that they post about themselves. 
While Facebook does offer fairly granular privacy settings to help users choose who can see the data 
they post, these settings have, historically, been severely misunderstood by their users [36]. The user 
may also post status messages to their profile that provide updates on their thoughts or activities.  
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Figure 1.1: Facebook User Profile 
 
1.2.2 The Wall 
A user’s wall, as shown in Figure 1.2, is a place for their friends to send publicly-viewable messages 
directly to the user. Unlike a status message, wall posts tend to be more targeted at the Wall’s owner. 
The Wall will also contain a brief “recent activity” section that summarizes updates to the user’s profile 
and their latest actions on the site. 
 
Unfortunately, due to limitations in the Facebook API, the content of a user’s Wall is not accessible to a 
third party Facebook application at this time. As a result, the application developed for this thesis is 
unable to detect malicious content that is posted directly to a user’s Wall unless it shows up inside of a 
News Feed. 
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Figure 1.2: Facebook Wall 
 
1.2.3 The News Feed 
Like the Wall, the user’s News Feed, or stream as it is called in the Facebook API documentation, is a 
collection of messages, status updates, and shared media posted by others in the user’s social network. 
However, unlike the Wall, which is comprised of messages all directed at the user, the News Feed is an 
aggregation of content from all of the user’s friends. For example, if Bob were to post a status message 
with a link to a funny video he is watching, this would not show up on Alice’s wall. It would, however, be 
eligible to show up in Alice’s News Feed along with all of the other news from her friends. Depending on 
a user’s privacy settings, wall posts between mutual friends may also show up in a user’s News Feed.  
The News Feed is the central focus for this thesis since it is the primary source of content that is 
automatically scanned for malicious links.  
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1.2.4 Applications 
With the release of the Facebook API, the site began to allow third party developers to extend the 
functionality of Facebook. In order to create a compelling and useful experience for the user, the API 
allows an application to access most areas of the site, including user profiles and News Feeds, with the 
same permissions as the user who is running it. This allows users to post status updates and access 
information from their friends through individual applications.  
 
Since the release of the Facebook API, applications of every conceivable function, useful or otherwise, 
have been created to run inside the Facebook environment. Examples of some popular Facebook 
applications include Music, which allows users to post songs to their profiles that can be streamed by 
others, Astrology Daily, which updates the user’s status with a daily horoscope based on their birth date, 
and Farmville, a farm simulation game similar to the SimCity series that includes social networking 
aspects to the gameplay. 
 
When a user chooses to run a given application, it is “installed” to their profile by becoming associated 
with their Facebook account after it is manually approved, as shown in Figure 1.3. Once this is complete, 
the application is able to execute within the context of the user’s profile and perform whatever 
functionality it has been designed for.  
 
 
Figure 1.3: Application Approval Request 
 
In a small number of cases, users must explicitly opt-in to certain application functions by approving 
requests for special permissions. Some of these special permissions include the ability to update the 
user’s status, the ability to send email to the user, and the ability to upload videos and photos to the 
7 
 
user’s profile [15]. An example of the special permission request to read the user’s News feed, as 
required by this thesis, is shown in Figure 1.4. Unfortunately, beyond these standard and relatively 
nondescript opt-in screens, the user has no further insight into what the application is designed to do 
except for what the developer chooses to reveal in its description. This prevents a very real security 
concern for users of Facebook, more of which will be discussed in Section 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Special Permission Request 
 
The proof-of-concept performed by this thesis is developed as a Facebook application. The application 
relies heavily on the Facebook API, both to provide an avenue for testing as well as access to a user’s 
social networking data.  
 
1.3 Work Presented 
This thesis uses a set of PHP and BASH scripts to create a Facebook application that acts as a proof-of-
concept for the method of using social networking data to aid in the detection of malicious web content. 
Data was collected over the course of four weeks from Facebook profiles of real users and analyzed to 
determine its ability to improve the success rates of some traditional detection methods. The following 
sections will present detailed descriptions and analysis of these methods, the application’s design, and 
the findings and conclusions of this thesis. 
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2 
Related Work 
 
2.1 Overview 
Unfortunately for both social networking users and the security industry, little work has been done to 
study ways in which malware protections can be applied specifically to online communities. Most of the 
historical methods have taken the approach of monitoring a user’s web browser activity in general, 
while ignoring the additional data that can be gleaned from social networks to help personalize the 
protection experience. In addition, nearly all previous efforts have been focused on stopping the spread 
of either malware or unsolicited (spam) email.  It has only been in very recent months that developers 
have started to look at some of a user’s social networking data to help software make more educated 
and user-tailored decisions. These methods will be outlined in the following sections and the differences 
proposed by this thesis will be explained. 
 
2.2 The Historical Approach to Security 
Although malware research has been taking place since almost the time of the first personal computers, 
most of what is still considered relevant to the heuristics-based approach to malware detection has 
been created in the past five to six years. In 2004, researchers from Stanford University released the first 
iteration of the SpoofGuard plugin for the Internet Explorer browser [6]. The plugin is designed to 
perform dynamic content analysis for sites a user browses to and attempts to quantify the probability of 
whether or not the site is a fraud with a value called a “spoof index”. In the event that the spoof index 
for a site exceeds a user-defined threshold, a visual warning is displayed to alert the user to the 
potential hazard. The spoof index itself is calculated by performing a series of tests, such as searching for 
URLs that contain suspicious characters like “@” or many subdomains, sites that require passwords but 
do not have valid SSL certificates, and searching for hashes of images that exist in other legitimate 
domains, such as E-Trade’s etrade.com. Each test returns a result of “0”, which indicates a safe score, or 
“1”, which indicates a suspicious score. The test results are then weighted and aggregated to determine 
the overall score for the website a user is visiting. The result is a relatively effective spoofing detection 
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algorithm that can also monitor SSL sessions, given that it is in line with the HTTPS transaction. However, 
since SpoofGuard relies entirely on dynamic heuristics for detection, it is easy for an attacker to adjust 
the properties of their page to fool SpoofGuard’s detection mechanisms.  
 
A Carnegie Mellon University paper released in 2006 described an algorithm for unwanted email 
detection, called “phishing identification by learning on features of email received”, or PILFER [19]. The 
PILFER algorithm examines URLs for a variety of suspicious characteristics, including ones that are based 
on an IP address, mismatches between the text of a hyperlink and its destination, the number of “.” or 
subdomains in a link, and the age of the domain that is being linked to, since newer domains tend to 
have a higher chance of being malicious. When the algorithm was tested against corpora consisting of 
both legitimate and malicious emails, researchers found that it had a 99% accuracy rate and a less than 
1% rate of false positives, which is simply unheard of in the field of automatic malware detection. The 
only potential disadvantage of such a successful algorithm is actually success itself. In other words, due 
to the success rate of PILFER, it is likely that spammers and malware writers would find ways to study its 
detection methods and write malicious code designed to fool these methods. Unfortunately, this is 
something that is easily done with most dynamic methods. 
 
Just a year later in 2007, researchers released the Carnegie Mellon Anti-Phishing and Network Analysis 
Tool (CANTINA), which is a security toolbar for Internet Explorer based on the PILFER algorithm [44].  
CANTINA uses a somewhat unique approach of utilizing both heuristic-based methods developed for 
PILFER as well as content analysis. To do this, CANTINA uses the Term Frequency/Inverse Document 
Frequency (TF-IDF) [11] and Robust Hyperlinks [30] algorithms to generate a list of keywords associated 
with the content of a site, which is then queried via Google to make a determination about which 
domain name should likely be associated with that keyword list. The idea behind this detection method 
is that a keyword list of Windows, Vista, and Office might return a Google search result containing 
references to Microsoft.com. If the site a user is looking at contains these keywords but is not hosted in 
the Microsoft.com domain, it may be potentially fraudulent. When tested against a database of 200 
fraudulent and legitimate URLs, the CANTINA toolbar was able to detect about 95% of the known 
phishing sites. Yet, the authors cited performance problems and the limitation of only searching sites 
written in English as some of its key flaws. These limitations would ultimately have to be resolved before 
CANTINA was useful for widespread implementation. 
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The Netcraft Toolbar is another popular security plugin for Internet Explorer that seeks to warn users 
about visiting potentially hazardous websites [28]. The Netcraft Toolbar largely relies on a community 
maintained blacklist, making it more up-to-date than traditional blacklists that rely on a single entity for 
updates. Netcraft also provides some basic heuristic detection techniques for sites that are not listed in 
the database, such as looking for IP addresses in URLs and non-standard port numbers. One of the 
advantages of using Netcraft as touted by the developer is that it is unsusceptible to DNS poisoning, 
since it resolves all URLs into their IP address for domain analysis. However, it does rely solely on visual 
cues in the toolbar area, which means that some users may miss its warnings if they are not careful or 
alert. 
 
As of 2007, there were well over a dozen security toolbars claiming to offer users protection against 
malicious websites. This is likely what spurred a research paper designed to test many of them in real-
world scenarios to see which were the most effective [43]. While the experiment included no PILFER-
based tools, such as CANTINA, researchers found that SpoofGuard, EarthLink, and Netcraft were the top 
three performers in terms of success rates. However, SpoofGuard, the most successful of the three, also 
had the highest false positive rate. Google’s Safe Browsing blacklist was also included in the study and 
although it was not able to identify some of the newest threats, which is a limitation of any static 
blacklist, its results vastly improved in just 12-24 hours of a site’s existence. This would indicate that 
Google’s Safe Browsing API would be an invaluable resource for tools that need to query a blacklist 
without maintaining their own. 
 
2.3 The Social Approach to Security 
In 2005, before most people widely associated the term “social network” with sites like MySpace and 
Facebook, researchers from the University of Florida and the University of California at Los Angeles 
proposed an algorithm that could be used to construct a visual mapping of a user’s social network based 
on the header information from emails in their inbox, such as the To:, From: and CC: fields [5]. The 
network created by this algorithm was then used to make an estimation of which emails were likely 
spam and which were likely legitimate, based on where the senders lie within the map. For example, 
when a user lies on the far edge of a network where no common nodes are shared, that user is more 
likely to be a spammer than someone at the center of the network, with whom one may share many 
common nodes. The authors of this algorithm were able to successfully implement it in a real-world trial 
and found that they were able to correctly identify spam about half of the time (56%). However, success 
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with identifying legitimate emails was much lower at 34% with 47% of the emails examined being 
marked as unclassifiable [5]. Thus, the algorithm in its initial stages is too underdeveloped to be practical 
for an average user. 
 
In the latter half of 2009, Twitter finally acknowledged the problem that malicious sites were being 
spread by exploiting the trust people place in its service [29+. Although Twitter’s technical process for 
deciding what sites are malicious has yet to be determined, users are now blocked from sharing links 
that are known to contain malware. Facebook also quietly supports a similar feature, which will prevent 
users from sending certain links in a message if they are reported as “abusive” by the Facebook 
community, as seen in Figure 2.1. In attempts to contact both Twitter and Facebook for comments on 
these protections and how they work, only form replies were received (see Appendices K and L).  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Facebook’s URL Filtering 
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Although at the time of this writing shortened URLs, such as those created using TinyURL, are typically 
ignored by URL filtering services, some services like bit.ly have released similar filters to prevent users 
from obfuscating the presence of malware with URL shortening services [29]. This is important because 
URL shortening services make heuristic detection of suspicious URL characteristics difficult and, thus, 
malware authors have recently depended on them to help spread their attacks. 
 
While it is not exactly an example of Internet security, a new social review site called Unvarnished uses 
information from a user’s Facebook account, which is required for access to the service, to perform 
some basic levels of fraud protection. In the event that a user was to create a fake Facebook profile to 
access Unvarnished, the site could detect this and block the user from posting on the site. To do this, the 
fraud detection looks at both when the Facebook account was created and the number of friends that 
the user has [35]. Presumably, a profile that was recently created and does not have any friends can be 
considered fraudulent and access to Unvarnished could be blocked to prevent defacement. As an 
increasing number of sites allow users to login using a Facebook account through Facebook Connect, 
these types of heuristics for security and fraud detection have the chance to become more 
commonplace [16]. 
 
To those who are active in technology and social networking circles, it would come as no surprise to 
state that the use of social networking services has simply exploded in the past six years. However, what 
may be an unexpected side effect of this statistic is the fact that the spread of malware and phishing 
attacks through these sites has increased at a rate at or above the legitimate use of these sites. In 
Microsoft’s Security Intelligence Report Volume 7, the company reported seeing a tremendous increase 
in social networking-based phishing scams in the early- to mid-portions of 2009. While the social 
networking category comprised only about 10% of the total number of phishing sites in April 2009, this 
figure jumped to about 50% in May 2009. By June 2009, just one short month later, 76% of all phishing 
sites categorized by Microsoft’s report were in the category of social networking *4].With these alarming 
statistics, it is shocking to find such few efforts focused specifically on the threats targeting social 
networking communities. 
 
2.4 New Methods 
Much of the aforementioned research has provided a significant theoretical basis for the work 
performed for this thesis. The heuristic and content analysis methods are all critical components of the 
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application that was developed and tested. In addition, the experience of past researchers in the 
successes and limitations of these methods was useful in understanding the best approach to building 
and testing the tool. However, the key difference that sets this research apart is the use of social 
networking data from services like Facebook and Twitter to aid in malicious site detection and help 
reduce the number of false positives produced by the tool. Unfortunately for the security industry, there 
has yet to be any significant research performed to test the effectiveness of these methods.  
 
Sites like Facebook and Twitter offer an enormous wealth of information that is being automatically 
compiled and is also more up-to-date than anything a static blacklist would reasonably be able to 
provide within a set period of time. With the APIs released for these sites, this previously untapped 
knowledge base can now be queried with relative ease. While the novel use of social networking data 
has been shown to be effective in many interesting areas of research, including accurately predicting 
box-office revenues for films [3], it has been left relatively untouched for security research, which is a 
detriment to the industry.  
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3 
Methodology 
 
3.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis was to test the effectiveness of augmenting traditional heuristic-based 
methods for malware detection with a user’s social networking data via a new Facebook application. 
 
3.2 Environment 
The application for this thesis was developed and tested on a 1.6 GHz AMD Athlon XP 2000+ PC with 256 
MB of RAM. The system used the following software versions: 
 
Name Purpose Version 
CentOS Operating System 5.4 (2.6 Kernel) 
Apache HTTPd Web Server 2.2.3 
MySQL Database Server 5.0.77 
PHP Script Processor 5.1.6 
Table 3.1: Software Versions 
 
Apart from the software listed above, the application requires few resources. The application must be 
accessible via HTTP from the client’s system. 
 
3.2 Application Design 
The methodology of this thesis was coarsely segmented into two separate categories: development of 
the Facebook application and testing the application’s effectiveness. First, the application was 
developed using the rough process outline depicted in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Application Process Flow 
 
In order to implement the design shown in Figure 3.1, the application was built from five core scripts: 
index.php, scanner.php, fb-checks.php, url-checks.php, and manual-scan.php. In addition, several 
ancillary scripts were required to accomplish some of the primary goals of the application. Each of these 
scripts is described in more detail in the following sections. 
 
3.2.1 index.php 
The index.php script comprises the main page of the application that a user will visit. Upon loading, the 
script browses through the last 100 posts in the user’s News Feed and uses a regular expression to find 
URLs that may have been posted there. While it does this search, it also keeps a tally of the stream posts 
seen from each friend. These totals are added to a local database so that it is possible to track the 
relative frequency with which a user communicates with each of their friends. Unfortunately, because 
this information is not available directly through the Facebook API, the application must keep track of 
this on its own in order to provide more effective scanning functionality.  
 
The application will parse both the News Feed posts, as well as their attachments, for evidence of any 
hyperlinks. When found, the link is added to an array that is eventually sent, along with some metadata 
about the post and its author, to the scanner.php script. When parsing, the application will keep close 
Hyperlinks Collected 
•Sources: User's Facebook 
News Feed, Manual input 
Facebook Heuristics 
•Is sender a friend? # of 
mutual friends with 
sender? etc. 
Traditional Heuristcs 
•Physical location of 
server? Age of domain? 
etc. 
Google Safe 
Browsing 
•Is URL on blacklist or 
malware list? 
Twitter Heuristics 
•Is the link being tweeted? 
Final Weighted 
Score Calculated 
•Min: -124 
•Max: +17 
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track of the links that are found to prevent duplicate URLs from being scanned. For the purposes of this 
application, a link is considered a duplicate if the exact URL appears more than once in the same 
message, including its attachments. Finally, the application will also keep track of the time the scan is 
being run and purposely not consider URLs which were found prior to time of the last performed scan.  
 
The full source code for index.php can be found in Appendix A.  
 
3.2.2 scanner.php 
The scanner.php script is responsible for initiating each of the test functions and will also create the final 
score report. The test functions are invoked for each hyperlink in the array passed from index.php. Once 
each test function completes and returns a weighted version of the $GOOD_SCORE or $BAD_SCORE 
variables (or $NO_SCORE in the event of an error), the script aggregates the scores and a report is 
printed to the screen for the user’s perusal. In addition, a delimited version of the score report is saved 
to the application server, where it can be further parsed and analyzed by administrators. 
 
In total, the application submits each link to a series of 15 different tests. Of these 15, seven are fully 
dependent on data mined from social networking content. 
 
The full source code for scanner.php can be found in Appendix B. 
 
3.2.3 fb-checks.php 
The fb-checks.php script contains each of the test functions for all Facebook-related checks. As 
mentioned previously, each test should return a weighted version of $GOOD_SCORE or $BAD_SCORE to 
be added to the link’s final score. In total, six test functions were written that depend on the Facebook 
API for data. The tests that comprise this script can be found in Table 3.2. 
 
Test Name Purpose 
senderIsFriend Checks to see if the sender of the link is a friend of 
the user. 
hasMutualFriends Checks the number of mutual friends the user has 
with the sender. This test is based on research by 
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[5]. 
attendsEvents Checks to see if the user is attending/has attended 
any events with the sender. The theory is that the 
user does not attend events with malicious users. 
photoIsTagged Checks to see if the user is tagged in any photos 
with the author. The theory is that the user does 
not appear in pictures with malicious users. 
chatsOften Checks to see if the user sees posts by the author 
often. The theory is that a link which comes from 
an author who does not post links often may be 
malicious. 
isInTrustedList Checks to see if the author is in the user’s trusted 
friend list that they selected when the application 
started. 
Table 3.2: Facebook-related Tests 
 
The full source code for fb-checks.php can be found in Appendix C. 
 
3.2.4 url-checks.php 
The url-checks.php script contains each of the test functions for all URL-related checks. As mentioned 
previously, each test should return a weighted version of $GOOD_SCORE or $BAD_SCORE to be added 
to the link’s final score. In total, eight test functions were written that analyze the URL for suspicious 
characteristics. In addition to the six socially-dependent tests written for fb-checks.php, this script adds 
another, twitterSearch, which is also dependent on social data from Twitter.  The tests that comprise 
this script can be found in Table 3.3. 
 
Test Name Purpose 
serverLocation Checks the geographic location of the web server. 
Based on research by [43] and [4].  
domainAge Checks the age of the domain name. Based on 
research by [44] and [6].  
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suspiciousCharacters Checks the URL for the presence of "@" or many (> 
1) "-" characters. Based on research by [44] and 
[6].  
nonStandardPort Checks to see if the website is being hosted on a 
non-standard port. Non-standard ports are 
considered to be anything other than TCP/80 or 
TCP/443. Based on research by [43].  
manySubDomains Checks the URL for the presence of many 
subdomains (> 3). Most legitimate sites will keep 
the amount of subdomains to 3 or less for the sake 
of ease for their visitors (i.e. mycourses.rit.edu, 
mail.google.com, etc.). However, malicious sites 
may use many subdomains to trick visitors by 
using keywords that are associated with other 
sites (i.e. www.microsoft.com.test.net). Based on 
research by [44].  
hasIPAddress Checks the URL for the use of IP address instead of 
domain name. Few legitimate sites will neglect to 
register a domain name for their site since it 
makes it easier to remember for users. Malicious 
sites that will likely be short lived may not go to 
the trouble of registering a domain name. Based 
on research by [44]. 
usesSSL Checks to see if the URL is using HTTP or HTTPS. 
Few malicious sites will take the time to setup an 
SSL version of their site. In addition, this test 
considers a site built with SSL as more secure. 
Based on research by [6].  
checkSafeBrowsing Checks the URL hash against the Google Safe 
Browsing databases (both blacklist and malware) 
to see if the site is known to be malicious. 
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twitterSearch Searches Twitter for the full URL and, if it is not 
found, the domain used in the URL to see if it is 
being shared there. The theory is that popular links 
and well-known domains should appear in Twitter 
search results. Malicious or obscure sites should 
not appear in Twitter search results. 
Table 3.3: URL-related Tests 
 
The full source code for url-checks.php can be found in Appendix D. 
 
3.2.5 manual-scan.php 
The manual-scan.php script was created to provide a manual interface for the URL scanner. Unlike 
index.php that automatically scans a user’s News Feed and extracts links that have been posted there, 
this script allows the user to pass any arbitrary URLs to the same tests used in the automated scan 
without requiring that they are first made available within the user’s stream.  
 
This interface has benefits for both the user and the researcher. First, the manual scan gives the user the 
ability to test URLs with the application that were seen in sources other than the News Feed, such as the 
user’s Wall, which is currently inaccessible via the Facebook API, or an email message external to the 
site. In addition, the researcher is able to test certain URLs that are known to be malicious and should 
generate a negative score, which would otherwise be blocked from being posted directly on Facebook 
(see Figure 2.1). This is made possible since any URLs submitted for testing via the manual scan interface 
are only passed to the application server and are never seen by Facebook or its users. 
 
The full source code for manual-scan.php can be found in Appendix E. 
 
3.2.6 create-db.sql 
The application also uses two MySQL databases with several simple tables to keep track of certain 
information, such as the last time the user scanned their News Feed with the application and the active 
hashes for the Google Safe Browsing data. This script was run to initially setup these databases on the 
server. In theory, this script should only have to be run once on the server that is hosting the application 
data. 
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CREATE DATABASE linkchecker; 
USE linkchecker; 
CREATE TABLE updateTime (userID varchar(32) not null primary key, 
updateTime int); 
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, CREATE ON linkchecker.* TO 
'linkchecker'@'localhost' IDENTIFIED BY ‘linkchecker’; 
FLUSH PRIVILEGES; 
 
 CREATE DATABASE safebrowsing; 
 USE safebrowsing; 
 CREATE TABLE updates (id int not null primary key, type varchar(16), 
updateTime datetime, version varchar(32)); 
 INSERT INTO updates (id, type, updateTime, version) VALUES (1, 
'blacklist', '2010-04-21 12:21:03', -1); 
INSERT INTO updates (id, type, updateTime, version) VALUES (2, 
'malware', '2010-04-21 12:21:03', -1); 
CREATE TABLE blacklist_hash (hash varchar(32) primary key, 
INDEX(hash)); 
CREATE TABLE malware_hash (hash varchar(32) primary key, INDEX(hash)); 
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, DROP, CREATE, INDEX ON 
safebrowsing.* TO 'googlesb'@'localhost'; 
GRANT FILE ON *.* to 'googlesb'@'localhost'; 
FLUSH PRIVILEGES; 
 
3.2.7 sb-black-updates.sh & sb-malware-updates.sh 
The sb-black-updates.sh and sb-malware-updates.sh scripts are BASH script designed to periodically 
check for and apply updates from Google’s Safe Browsing API. As part of the API’s Acceptable Usage 
policy, clients must update their lists every half hour and include mechanisms for backing off after an 
error [12]. These scripts include this functionality and ensure that the database used to store the Safe 
Browsing information remains up-to-date.  
 
The full source code for sb-black-updates.sh and sb-malware-updates.sh can be found in Appendices G 
and H. 
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3.2.8 getcurrentver.sql 
The getcurrentver.sql script is a simple script used to retrieve the version of the last update which was 
applied to the Google Safe Browsing hash database. Each time an update to the hash database is 
received from Google, the application keeps track of this in the “updates” table of the “safebrowsing” 
database. The source code for the script is as follows: 
  
USE safebrowsing; 
SELECT version FROM updates; 
 
Upon completion, the script should return the following result, which lists both the blacklist (line 2) and 
malware list (line 3) versions last received from Google: 
 
 version 
54853 
20634 
 
3.2.9 inserthashes-black.sql & inserthashes-malware.sql 
The inserthashes-black.sql and inserthashes-malware.sql scripts are used by sb-black-updates.sh and sb-
malware-updates.sh (see Section 3.2.7) to insert any new hashes received in a Safe Browsing update 
from Google into the local hash database. The source code for theses scripts is as follows: 
 
-- inserthashes-black.sql 
USE safebrowsing; 
LOAD DATA INFILE '/tmp/blackadds.tmp' 
INTO TABLE blacklist_hash 
FIELDS TERMINATED BY '+' 
(@skip, hash); 
 
-- inserthashes-malware.sql 
USE safebrowsing; 
LOAD DATA INFILE '/tmp/malwareadds.tmp' 
INTO TABLE malware_hash 
FIELDS TERMINATED BY '+' 
(@skip, hash); 
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3.2.10 recreate-black-hash.sql & recreate-malware-hash.sql 
Typically, when a client requests a Safe Browsing update, the API will respond with a “diff” version that 
lists the changes that must be made to the client’s database to bring it up-to-date. In some cases, the 
client could be so exceptionally out-of-date that the diff list would be larger than if the entire list was 
sent again. In these situations, the client will drop the old version of the table and recreate it using the 
recreate-black-hash.sql and recreate-malware-hash.sql scripts. The source code for theses scripts is as 
follows: 
 
-- recreate-black-hash.sql 
USE safebrowsing; 
 
DROP TABLE blacklist_hash; 
CREATE TABLE blacklist_hash (hash varchar(32) primary key, 
INDEX(hash)); 
 
-- recreate-malware-hash.sql 
USE safebrowsing; 
 
DROP TABLE malware_hash; 
CREATE TABLE malware_hash (hash varchar(32) primary key, INDEX(hash)); 
 
3.2.11 Extensibility  
The application was designed to be as modular as possible, allowing new heuristic methods to be added 
in the future. To add new tests, a developer simply needs to write the testing function, ensuring that it 
returns a weighted version of the $GOOD_SCORE or $BAD_SCORE variables, (or $NO_SCORE if it 
encounters an error) and add their function call to the scanner.php script (see Section 3.2.2). This can be 
done by adding the following lines to the script, which will enable the test and include it in the final 
score report: 
 
$result = <scan_function>; 
echo "<scan_name>: " . $result . "<br />"; 
$output .= "^" . $result; 
$score += $result; 
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3.3 Application Testing 
Once the application was built, testing began by volunteers who approved the application for use on 
their profiles and ran the automatic scan on their News Feeds several times. In order to reach the largest 
amount of potential users in the shortest amount of time, brief descriptions of the application and this 
thesis, as well as a link to the application, were posted as status messages on two different Facebook 
profiles. While this method had the potential to reach a total of 377 individuals, only 22 took the time to 
participate in the study. While the reasons for this are unknown, likely causes include lack of user 
patience with the slow performance of the application (see Section 5.2) and lack of user interest in 
participating. In addition, lack of awareness may also be a factor, since users with large networks may 
see hundreds of News Feed posts in a day and a single request for volunteers may go unnoticed by 
relatively inactive users. 
 
After several weeks of users performing the automated scans, requests were made of some of the most 
active users to run manual scans with a pre-compiled test data set. This allows analysis of the 
application’s effectiveness against data that is known to be safe or suspicious. This data set was 
comprised of 100 URLs, half of which were known to be safe and half of which were known to be 
suspicious. The 50 safe links were selected at random from the safe data set released by 3Sharp in their 
2006 evaluation of various Anti-Phishing tools for the Windows Operating System [34]. This also 
happens to be a portion of the data set used by [44]. The remaining 50 suspicious URLs were taken at 
random from two different sources on April 8, 2010: MalwarePatrol’s Aggressive Malware Block List and 
PhishTank’s validated phishing list *8, 31]. Once the data set was compiled, it was split into two separate 
tests, in the interests of performance and reducing the application load. Each user scanned the first data 
set with a sender of their choosing (if the user had a trusted friend list configured for their Facebook 
profile, it was asked that they select a friend from this list). At a later time, each user was asked to scan 
the second data set with a different sender (this time not in the trusted friend list, if one was 
configured). The results from these tests were collected and analyzed in the same way that data from 
the automated scans was. 
 
The effectiveness of the application was judged on the number of sites that it can correctly categorize, 
given a chosen score threshold, including considerations for false positives and negatives. With the 
values of $GOOD_SCORE and $BAD_SCORE chosen for testing, a link can receive a score between -124 
and +17. It should be noted, however, that because scores from the Google Safe Browsing check are 
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weighted so heavily, a link that is not found in the Safe Browsing database will typically receive a score 
between -24 and +17. 
 
3.4 Validity 
Although 22 people approved the application for use on their Facebook profile, score reports were only 
received from eight individuals. While the reasons for this are unclear, the external validity of this thesis 
may be rightly examined. 
 
Likely due to the dangers of Facebook applications and the barrage of information that users see in their 
News Feed from both friends and other applications, it can be difficult to obtain a large user base for the 
testing of such an application. For the purposes of this thesis, attempts were made to offset this 
problem in several ways. First, the application was designed to be as automated as possible so that 
users only need to click a few times to generate the data needed for this research. In addition, this thesis 
foregoes seeking a large user base in favor of larger data sets. In other words, rather than trying to get 
50-100 people to run the application, the goal instead was to get a handful of people to run the 
application many times in order to get a large data set. This technique has been used by researchers in 
the past in other successful studies related to malicious web content [5, 6, 13, 19, 43, 44]. As a result, 
this thesis was able to generate result sets of well over 800 URLs tested against eight user profiles. While 
these methods help to overcome the problems of achieving validity, a more formal study may need to 
be conducted in order to understand how a more diverse set of Facebook users would affect the results 
of the tests. 
 
3.5 Limitations 
3.5.1 API Related 
Unfortunately, many of the disadvantages of this method stem from limitations in the Facebook API. For 
example, because information posted directly to a user’s Wall is unavailable unless it happens to show 
up in a News Feed, there is a large amount of information that the application cannot parse for 
hyperlinks. This is especially troublesome because targeted attacks focused at a specific user would 
likely utilize the victim’s Wall in order to spread the malicious link. Unfortunately, at the time of this 
writing, there is no remedy for this limitation provided by Facebook and thus software with more 
functionality potential, such as a browser plugin, would be required to scan this data. 
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Another limitation of the API that impacts the amount of information that can be effectively scanned by 
the application is its accessibility issues with certain data sources. Because there is no simple or efficient 
way to selectively parse comments to a News Feed post or a user’s Facebook Inbox, an email-like 
environment within Facebook, the application’s design forgoes scanning this information in favor of 
performance and limiting the amount of calls that need to be made to the Facebook API. However, since 
these are legitimate sources of potentially malicious links, they should still be addressed by future 
versions of the application.   
 
3.5.2 Non-API Related 
While the Facebook API certainly has its limitations, this detection method certainly has its own set of 
flaws which are unique to its theory. For example, circumvention of the application’s scanning abilities 
could be severely prohibitive if a malicious user was able to impersonate an acquaintance of their victim. 
In this way, an attacker could exploit the inherent trust users place in social networking services and fool 
their victims into browsing to a malicious site, provided they were also able to circumvent the other 
heuristic tests configured for this application. Potential methods of prevention of user impersonation 
would be to associate some semi-identifiable information to a user’s account that is unlikely to change, 
such as the geographic location of their public IP address or their hard drive’s serial number. In this way, 
account activity that takes place outside of these known parameters could trigger a warning or account 
verification process that would indicate potential account fraud and prevent the exploitation of trust. 
Unfortunately, sufficient data of this type was not available through the Facebook API at the time of this 
writing, and thus was unavailable for inclusion in the application. However, a new privacy policy 
proposed by Facebook in March 2010 may offer this ability if it becomes approved. The proposed policy 
alludes to the ability for Facebook to collect, as well as share with third parties in some cases, 
information such as “your browser type, location, and IP address, as well as the pages you visit”. In 
addition, the policy acknowledges the ability for some of this information to be used for authentication 
purposes by making “information about the location of your computer or access device and your age 
available to applications and websites in order to help them implement appropriate security measures” 
[32]. 
 
Shortened URLs also present a concern for any URL-based security analysis. URL shortening services, 
such as TinyURL and bit.ly, are designed to save characters when sharing long URLs by obfuscating the 
original address with a vanity URL (i.e. http://www.rit.edu/emcs/ptgrad/grad/1389.php3 becomes 
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http://bit.ly/bWvy7b). However, because the URL’s original properties become masked, it is relatively 
difficult to perform any dynamic analysis on them. To combat this problem, the application uses the 
Long URL Please API to detect and expand shortened URLs before they are passed to the scanner. While 
Long URL Please supports 80 different shortening services, including bit.ly and TinyURL, it is 
unreasonable to expect it to support all of them [9]. As a result, obscure shortening services have the 
ability to circumvent most of the URL-based checks this application provides. 
 
Finally, the capabilities of dynamic web technologies, such as JavaScript, present further challenges to a 
method based purely on URL characteristics. As any web developer will know, it is trivial to redirect a 
user to a new page once they visit an initial URL [41]. Because of this fact, an attacker could 
automatically redirect the victim to a malicious site by tricking them into visiting a seemingly harmless 
page. If the initial URL passes most checks performed by this application, the victim could still become 
infected by the page they are redirected to. In order to address this problem, future versions of the 
application would have to perform analysis of the page’s content, in addition to its URL, in the way other 
tools have done in the past [6, 43]. 
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4 
Application Usage 
 
4.1 Overview 
In order to provide an effortless testing process, running the proof-of-concept application was designed 
to use as little user input as possible. The application is split into two main functional components: the 
automated scan and the manual scan. The following sections will provide descriptions of both 
components, as well as a walkthrough of their usage from the client’s perspective. 
 
4.2 Automated Scans 
The automated scan is the main real-world data collection component of the application. It is also the 
first feature that a user will access when they add the application to their Facebook profile. To begin, the 
user will visit the main application page, which was hosted at http://apps.facebook.com/linkchecker for 
the course of this thesis. Once here, the user is presented with the prompt shown in Figure 4.1, which 
requires that the user approve the application for use on their profile.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Application Approval Request 
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Once the application’s basic functionality is approved, the user is asked to allow the application’s ability 
to read through the user’s News Feed, as shown in Figure 4.2. This functionality is required for the 
automated scan, since it is the primary source of content where the application will harvest URLs from. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Special Permission Request 
 
After all necessary permissions have been granted, the user enters the setup screen for the automated 
scan. On this page, the user is given a drop-down menu with any Friend Lists that they have configured 
for their Facebook profile. If the user elects to choose a Friend List on this page, they should select one 
that contains friends whom they trust content from, as seen in Figure 4.3. An option for “None” is also 
given, in case the user does not wish to choose a list or does not have any Friend Lists configured for 
their profile.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Selecting a Trusted List 
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The option selected by the user on this page is stored in a cookie for 30 days to alleviate the burden of 
selecting the list each time the application is executed, provided the user does not delete the cookie at 
the end of their browser session. Once the choice is saved, the automated scan begins. Therefore, the 
user can execute the automated scan in essentially one click during future sessions, since each of the 
previously mentioned steps are only required once and will be skipped in subsequent executions.  
 
Unfortunately, due to the Facebook application architecture and the nature of the PHP scripting 
language, the user sees only a blank iframe inside a Facebook page wrapper while the automated scan is 
running. During this time, the application is collecting information from the user’s News Feed, such as 
any links that are found and tallies of the number of posts seen from each friend. Depending on the size 
of the user’s network and the number of links that are found in the News Feed, the automated scan can 
take anywhere from a few seconds to a few minutes to complete. However, subsequent scans should 
see a slight performance improvement since much of the initial profile creation is only done during the 
first execution. When the scan completes, the user will see both a message indicating this and receive a 
copy of the scan report, as shown in Figure 4.4.  
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Figure 4.4: The Scan Report 
 
The scan report will include each of the links that were discovered, their scores for each test that was 
run, and a final aggregated score for each link. A delimited copy of the score report is also saved on the 
server for use in data analysis.  
 
Since the application for this thesis is used strictly for data collection and analysis in a proof-of-concept 
manor, the application simply ends after the score report is generated. However, with more research 
and further application design, a decision can be made about the nature of the link (safe or malicious). 
When this decision is able to be made, the application can also take further steps to protect the user, 
such as sending an email alert or adding a comment to the News Feed post indicating the nature of the 
link. Fortunately, all of this functionality is available through the Facebook API. However, it was chosen 
to forego this behavior for the purposes of this thesis to prevent the application from spamming a News 
Feed in the event of false positives. 
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4.2 Manual Scans 
The manual scan is designed to allow researchers and users to test links which were discovered outside 
of their Facebook News Feed, without requiring that they post them publicly. Links are collected 
manually, but then passed to the scanner and tested using the same scripts as the automated scan, 
which means that the results should be comparable to that of the automated scan. The user can initiate 
a manual scan by browsing to the manual-scan.php script, as shown in Figure 4.5.  
 
 
Figure 4.5: Manual Scan Setup 
 
Although the manual scan runs completely independently of the automated scan, the user should have 
run at least one automated scan before attempting the manual version. This will allow the scan results 
to be more complete, since the automated scan takes the time to allow the user to choose a trusted 
Friend List and generates the database of post tallies from each of their friends.  
 
On the manual scan setup page, the user is asked to enter the URLs to be scanned into a text box. The 
user is also asked to provide the Facebook user ID of the person who sent the link. The user may choose 
this from a drop-down menu of their Facebook friends list, or specify the user ID manually. This 
functionality allows the user to quickly and easily select a friend without knowledge of their user ID, or 
to enter the user ID of a Facebook user without necessarily adding them as a friend on their profile. 
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When the user finishes filling out and submitting the manual scan form, the URLs provided are parsed 
and sent to the same scanner that is used for the automated version of the scan. Therefore, application 
behavior is essentially identical from this point forward and a user will receive the same completion 
message and score report seen in the automated scan (see Figure 4.4). The only notable difference in 
these reports is that the post ID for each link will be shown as “0”, since the URLs were provided 
manually and not found in any News Feed post. 
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5 
Results & Discussion 
 
5.1 Data Analysis 
The following sections seek to analyze the data collected by the tests described in Section 3.3. The 
analysis is broken into two main groups: data for the manual scans and data for the automated scans. 
 
5.1.1 Manual Scan Analysis 
Because the manual scan tests were performed with a known data set of safe and malicious URLs, these 
results can be considered far more empirical and thus will be examined first. For the manual tests, the 
data set of 100 links was comprised of the URLs listed in Appendices I and J. These 100 URLs were then 
tested against profiles of four different Facebook users who had also participated in the automated scan 
testing. The first test consisted of 50 links (25 safe, 25 malicious) and asked users to choose a random 
friend in their trusted list as the sender. The second test with the remaining 50 links was performed with 
a user not in their trusted list chosen as the sender. In total, this resulted in 400 data points, which are 
briefly summarized in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 for the safe and malicious URLs, respectively. 
 
Score Measure Value 
# of Data Points 200 
Minimum Score -13.5 
Maximum Score +10 
Mean Score +3.2 
Median Score +3.5 
Mode Score +3.5 
Table 5.1: Safe URL Score Summary – Manual Scan 
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Score Measure Value 
# of Data Points 200 
Minimum Score -103.5 
Maximum Score +9 
Mean Score -8.2 
Median Score +1.5 
Mode Score +1.5 
Table 5.2: Malicious URL Score Summary – Manual Scan 
 
As the high-level results in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 seem to indicate, the application does a decent job of 
identifying safe and malicious URLS. On average, the mean score for a safe URL is a positive number and 
the mean score for a malicious URL is a negative number. However, to further understand the 
effectiveness of the application, one must understand the success and failure rates of its algorithm. To 
do this, an appropriate scoring threshold must be chosen that will allow the application to make a 
definitive estimate of the URL’s intent. As shown in Figure 5.1, a scoring threshold of +2.5 was chosen 
for these tests, since this value is exactly in between the median scores for safe (+3.5) and malicious 
(+1.5) URLs. This means that any score greater than, or equal to, +2.5 will be considered a safe URL and 
scores less than +2.5 will be considered malicious.  
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Figure 5.1: Manual Scan Test Scores - Unsorted 
 
Apart from a small group of outliers in the malicious URL results, which was caused by the URL receiving 
a heavily weighted negative score for being found in the Google Safe Browsing blacklists, the majority of 
the data points are seen to be heavily grouped in the -2 to +7 range of scores. This is ultimately an 
indicator of less than adequate performance, since it is difficult to be sure of the results for each URL 
when it is so close to the scoring threshold. This problem becomes quite apparent when the scores are 
sorted in numerical order and graphed, as shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Manual Scan Test Scores – Sorted 
 
The tight grouping problem could likely be solved in a number of ways. First, the addition of more tests 
to the application will allow for more granular scoring and may increase the variance in scores between 
safe and malicious URLs. In addition, a more significant score weighting system may help to greater the 
distance between a safe and a malicious score. Finally, increasing the size of the data set will help to 
determine what typical scores should be for safe and malicious URLs. 
 
Since the malicious status of each link in the manual scan is known, the success and failure rates of the 
application can be accurately calculated for these tests. These rates are shown in Table 5.3. 
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Success/Failure Indicator Value Percentage 
Success Rate 250 of 400 62.5% 
False Positive Rate 
(Safe URLs w/ Malicious Score) 
61 of 200 30.5% 
False Negative Rate 
(Malicious URLs w/ Safe Score) 
89 of 200 44.5% 
Table 5.3: Manual Scan Success/Failure Indicators 
 
As the results from Table 5.3 show, the application was correct 62.5% of the time when using a scoring 
threshold of +2.5. However, the application also showed fairly significant false positive and false 
negative rates, which would certainly impact the effectiveness and trustworthiness of the scoring 
system in a production environment.  
 
In order to fully understand whether or not the use of social networking data is successful in helping to 
predict the presence of malicious content in URLs, the scores from all social networking-related tests can 
be removed and the success/failure rates can be re-calculated. The high-level summary of data for the 
recalculated scores is described in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. 
 
Score Measure Value 
# of Data Points 200 
Minimum Score -9 
Maximum Score +7 
Mean Score +4.9 
Median Score +5 
Mode Score +7 
Table 5.4: Safe URL Score Summary – Manual Scan without Social Networking Data 
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Score Measure Value 
# of Data Points 200 
Minimum Score -100 
Maximum Score +7 
Mean Score -5.8 
Median Score +4 
Mode Score +5 
Table 5.5: Malicious URL Score Summary – Manual Scan without Social Networking Data 
 
Using the same method of selecting a scoring threshold half way between the medians of the safe and 
malicious scores, the newly calculated scores are graphed with a scoring threshold of +4.5, as shown in 
Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: Manual Scan Test Scores without Social Networking Data 
 
When compared to Figure 5.1, the scores in Figure 5.3 appear to be much more linear and have a fewer 
range of values that they occupy. Yet, the success and failure indicators described in Table 5.6 do not 
seem to indicate that this is beneficial to the effectiveness of the application. 
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Success/Failure Indicator Value Percentage 
Success Rate 243 of 400 60.75% 
False Positive Rate 
(Safe URLs w/ Malicious Score) 
60 of 200 30% 
False Negative Rate 
(Malicious URLs w/ Safe Score) 
97 of 200 48.5% 
Table 5.6: Manual Scan Success/Failure Indicators without Social Networking Data 
 
Based on the comparison of the success and failure indicators described in Tables 5.3 and 5.6, it is 
unreasonable to make an assumption about the effectiveness of the use of social networking data in 
malicious URL prediction for this sample size, given that the values are so close. However, the results do 
indicate that there is potential for this method to be improved upon to the point where it does become 
effective. As the data shows, the use of social networking data allowed the application to identify an 
additional seven URLs that were malicious that would not have been detected otherwise. While the 
social networking data did induce a false positive for one additional URL, this behavior could likely be 
resolved through more appropriate score weighting. Ultimately, a larger sample size would need to be 
obtained to determine if these results are statistically significant, or even typical. However, it is clear, 
given the slight increase in effectiveness, that this application and its methods should be studied further. 
 
5.1.2 Automated Scan Analysis 
Although the results from the automated scan are much less empirical since the intent of the URLs is not 
known, analysis of these results is still of interest because it shows how the application performs in a 
real-world scenario. In total, 421 URLs were collected from eight unique Facebook profiles. The high-
level summary of these results is shown in Table 5.7. 
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Score Measure Value 
# of Data Points 421 
Minimum Score -2 
Maximum Score +11 
Mean Score +6.2 
Median Score +6.5 
Mode Score +6.5 
Table 5.7: URL Score Summary – Automated Scan 
 
Again, since the true intent of the URLs is not known, it is impossible to select a scoring threshold that 
exists between the medians of the safe and malicious scores. In this case, an arbitrary scoring threshold 
of 0 is selected for the purposes of analysis. This means that any positive score is considered safe and 
any negative score is considered malicious, since the majority of URLs in a News Feed should be safe. As 
shown in Figure 5.4, this scoring threshold would likely still result in a handful of false positives. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Automated Scan Test Scores 
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Based on the selection of these scoring criteria, it is clear that false positives have been included. For 
example, www.findyourburt.com, which is a promotional site maintained by the beauty products 
company Burt’s Bees, received a “malicious” score of -2.  Though this site clearly does not contain 
malware, it is unclear whether this should be considered spam/unsolicited content or a false positive. 
While it is impossible to determine the automated scan’s true success and failure rates without further 
analysis of each URL, it would likely provide the main functionality for a production version of this proof-
of-concept application in the future. Therefore, further work must be done to improve its effectiveness 
and scoring criteria.  
 
5.2 Remaining Issues 
The following sections describe the various issues with the application that are still outstanding and 
could be addressed in future studies or development endeavors.  
 
5.2.1 Performance 
With any application, performance is typically a primary concern. In the case of the development for this 
thesis, some performance was spared in favor of modularity to help aid future additions and changes to 
the application as APIs evolve and ideas for more tests become available. Therefore, although each link 
is submitted to each test function independently, this ultimately slows down the application from 
returning a prompt result when testing many links.  
 
While performance of this application is fairly slow, with some scans of less than 20 links taking several 
minutes to complete, scan times are still within usable limits, especially considering the hardware they 
were executed on. In addition, the scan times are certainly within reason when compared to what most 
users experience with traditional application-based virus scanners. Yet, this issue may seem exacerbated 
by the fact the user sees nothing but a white iframe while the scan is running. Unfortunately, there is no 
easy way to present a user with a loading or intermediate screen while the scan is in progress, since the 
web server will not return any result until the entire PHP script finishes processing. At this point, 
however, the scan will be complete and the score report will be shown.  
 
More modern server hardware and improvements in the efficiency of the scripts and their algorithms 
may help to improve application performance and generate a better experience for the user. 
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5.2.2 Scope 
The Facebook application itself is also an issue because of the scope it is allowed to run in. Although the 
Facebook development platform was chosen deliberately for its API and large user base, the same 
functionality could be built into a desktop application or browser plugin. While these concessions are 
acceptable for the proof-of-concept application that is this thesis, a production implementation of this 
research should have a more overarching scope and not be limited to the data accessible through APIs 
provided by companies like Facebook, Twitter, and Google, who all have a vested interest in keeping 
certain data to themselves. This would also allow the application to be exposed to data outside of the 
Facebook domain, such as a URL found on a friend’s blog, and take more active steps to protect the user 
from stumbling onto a malicious website, such as redirecting the browser or displaying a pop-up 
warning message. 
 
5.2.3 API Limitations 
As mentioned previously, limitations in the APIs used by this application, especially the Facebook API in 
particular, served to cripple certain functionality of the application that was originally planned for, such 
as the ability to scan a user’s Wall posts. Ultimately, the usefulness of this application is limited by the 
amount of data that is allowed to be gleaned from the vast information bases maintained by social 
networking sites. Since this data is the crux of this thesis’ core functionality, it becomes a significant 
issue when it cannot be accessed totally or easily.  
 
It does ultimately seem that the Facebook API provides enough data to third party developers to be able 
effectively prove that the concepts presented by this thesis are plausible. Yet, cooperation from sites 
like Facebook and Twitter would be required before an application like this was effective enough for 
widespread and active use by the Internet community.  
 
5.2.4 Response 
Of the 22 users who approved the Facebook application for use on their profile, the score reports 
received were only a compilation of those from eight individuals. While this is a detriment to the results 
set obtained for this thesis, it is also an issue that needs to be solved because it means that 14 users 
could have potentially sought security protection from this application and not have received it. As with 
any security application, user trust is directly related to its effectiveness, since users who do not trust an 
application will not allow themselves to be protected by it [42]. While the reasons for the discrepancy in 
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the number of users versus the number of reports generated could be caused by a number of issues, 
including slow performance, bugs in the reporting functions of the application, or change of heart by the 
user after seeing the permission requests from Facebook, more investigation and testing is needed to 
ensure 100% of the users who run the application receive some type of result.  
 
5.3 Security Concerns 
Throughout the development of this thesis, several security concerns became apparent that are specific 
to Facebook applications. Although they are technically ancillary to the scope of this thesis, they are 
nonetheless important and directly impact the effectiveness of the proof-of-concept application 
discussed herein. Thus, they will be described in the following sections. 
 
5.3.1 Information Disclosure 
While it was likely a beneficial business decision for Facebook to open their platform with an API and 
allow third party developers to create content that extends and enhances the user experience, it seems 
that many Facebook users are fairly indiscriminate when they select applications to add to their profile. 
In fact, 228 of the 421 URLs scraped from the News Feeds of users in this study by the automated scan 
were related to Facebook applications of various kinds and, more importantly, various developers. The 
reason this can be a security concern is that these applications, and subsequently their developers, have 
access to an enormous amount of the personal information that users add to their Facebook accounts. 
In many cases, because the application runs within the user’s own profile, this access to information is 
often in lieu of any privacy settings the user may think are protecting them. Worse, some of this access 
even extends into the information posted by the user’s friends, which means personal information could 
be harvested by an application without requiring the friends also approve the application’s access [40]. 
To be fair, the Facebook API documentation clearly states the various types of information that are 
accessible to third parties and even provides a sandbox environment to allow users to test what 
information from their profile is returned by various API calls [17]. However, it is likely safe to assume 
that most users will never take the time to read the API documentation, especially those who have no 
knowledge or interest in Facebook application development.  Instead, Facebook must do a better job of 
educating users about the dangers of third party applications and provide more accessible 
documentation on the exact nature of information being disclosed about them to applications run by 
themselves and their friends. 
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5.3.2 Development Environment 
Another enormous threat to the security of Facebook application users is inherent in the way the 
application development environment is designed. When a developer creates a Facebook application, 
they are given the opportunity to create a vanity URL for the apps.facebook.com domain, as was used by 
this thesis with http://apps.facebook.com/linkchecker. However, hosting for the application code is the 
sole responsibility of the developer and visiting the vanity URL simply displays the application within an 
iframe on the Facebook site. What this means is that Facebook does not maintain any control over the 
application’s functionality or developer’s intent whatsoever, apart from what was agreed to in the 
developer’s terms of service4. In fact, Facebook never has visibility into the application’s code at all since 
it is hosted entirely outside their domain. As a result, a developer can create a page in the 
apps.facebook.com domain and host their application within minutes without any approval or review 
from Facebook required, at which point the possibilities for functionality are limited only by the 
language they have chosen to develop with. 
 
Presumably, Facebook made a conscious effort to create such a development environment in order to 
provide a unified and seamless experience for the end-user. In fact, they have accomplished this since 
from the end-user’s perspective there is almost no indication that the application has been developed or 
hosted by anyone other than Facebook while the browser continues to make calls to third party web 
servers that may not be trusted. However, what Facebook has also accomplished is to create an 
environment that is simply ideal for social engineering. While the application developed for this thesis 
was presented to the user as something akin to a “malware scanner” for their Facebook profile, it could 
have just as easily contained code to present a spoofed Facebook login form with a message indicating 
to the user that their “session” has expired and they need to re-enter their credentials. From there, the 
application can collect the user’s input, store it to a database, and redirect the user back to their profile 
without any indication that a successful phishing attack has taken place. While this would certainly 
violate the developer’s terms of use, there is nothing technically in place that can be used to prevent it 
from happening. Furthermore, the effectiveness of such an attack would likely be magnified by the fact 
that, from the user’s perspective, their browser’s address bar still points to a site in the facebook.com 
domain. 
 
                                                          
4
 http://developers.facebook.com/policy/ 
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It is clear that such an environment, while certainly providing a seamless experience to the user, must 
be changed given its purely misleading functionality and ability for exploitation. This design may also 
hamper the efforts of security applications, including the one developed for this thesis, since the URL 
remains in what some may consider a trusted domain (facebook.com), even though the content is being 
served from a potentially malicious web server elsewhere.  Thus, all URL-related tests become moot for 
Facebook applications unless further analysis is performed into the actual content the URL is pointing to.  
 
In addition to these changes, however, Facebook must also consider changes to the freedom provided 
to third party developers since they are currently given free rein to serve any functionality they desire. 
Yet, it is possible that a solution may not yet exist for this problem, given that the industry has only 
recently been faced with it on a widespread scale. Only since the arrival of platforms like Apple’s iPhone 
and Google’s Android operating systems have we had to deal with the problem of software being 
developed by third parties but sold through avenues provided by the operating system companies, such 
as the iTunes App Store or the Android Marketplace. While the personal computer certainly allowed for 
this type of functionality, users were typically aware that they were purchasing software from a third 
party that was not endorsed by Microsoft or Apple since they could not purchase the product from them 
directly. As a result, sites like Facebook are now offering an app-based platform but have chosen to 
continue to leave the onus of awareness on the non-technical user for lack of a better solution. 
However, with the amount of personal information entrusted to Facebook and the clear opportunity for 
malice, this seems like an irresponsible decision.  
 
Apple’s model for dealing with this problem in their iTunes App Store, which requires that all 
applications sold there be reviewed and approved by the company before they are available, seems 
ineffective and inefficient. With the sheer amount of apps being submitted to Apple for review, which is 
now well over 100,000, it does not seem possible for the company to effectively review the functionality 
of each line of code in a timeframe that would be acceptable to developers hoping to quickly find a 
customer base [23]. This is doubly true for Facebook, which states there have been over 500,000 
applications developed with its API [37]. In addition, exerting such tight control over the development 
process could potentially stifle innovation and allow reviewers to potentially exhibit favoritism as they 
approve apps and allow them to be published to the store.  
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On the other hand, Google’s Android marketplace takes the completely opposite approach, and one that 
is similar to Facebook’s methods, by allowing developers to immediately release their software, even on 
their own site, without any approval from Google whatsoever. While this is certainly a more cost 
effective and realistic approach, it does little to provide assurance to Android users that the application 
is safe. To offset this, the Android platform will require special permission be granted to applications 
which perform extended functionality that could be potentially dangerous, such as the ability to access 
the Internet or the user’s contact list, similar to the methods used by Facebook applications. However, 
this still does not provide any indication of the actual functionality performed by the application since 
access to the Internet could, in the benign case, allow the application to serve dynamic advertisements 
or, in the malicious case, download a piece of malware to the device. 
 
It may be possible that a middle ground approach could be the most effective for the Facebook 
development platform. For example, a voluntary approval process could be offered, whereby 
applications would undergo thorough screening by Facebook and considered verified only if they are 
found to be safe for users. This is similar to the methods used by Microsoft with their “Certified for 
Windows” program *22]. While this would certainly increase the length of the development cycle, users 
could seek out applications which are specifically vetted by Facebook and anxious developers could 
choose to release an unverified application and leave discretion in the user’s hands. This, of course, also 
depends on how much a user trusts the Facebook verification process. In addition, Facebook could 
consider some type of certificate-like model. Similar to the way we use certificates signed by reliable 
authorities to judge the trust worthiness of unknown entities, Facebook could offer some type of 
developer certification program and issue certificates to those who are deemed trustworthy. Finally, 
certificates should also be used by developers to sign their applications, especially when they are being 
hosted on third party servers, so that a user can know the application code has not been tampered with. 
This is one example that is being actively used by the Android development guidelines. While these 
methods are certainly not fool-proof, they would provide a marked improvement over the current 
model. 
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6 
Conclusions 
 
It is undeniable, regardless of the application, that social networks contain an enormous amount of data 
that has largely been untapped. As social aspects to the Internet continue to expand in both quantity 
and scope, security of this data and the users of these sites will ultimately become an unavoidable 
concern.  
 
While more research must be done to prove the usefulness of social networking data in the field of 
security and web content analysis, this thesis makes it clear that studying the concept is worthwhile. In 
addition, this thesis shows that it is in fact possible to detect malicious web content with the help of 
heuristics based on social networking data. 
 
The success rates for the tests performed with this proof-of-concept application certainly do not rival 
the real-world success rates achieved by researchers such as Fette et al. [19] or Zhang et al. [44]. 
However, this thesis was able to exceed the 34% success rate for detecting legitimate content achieved 
by Boykin and Roychowdhury in their study of using social networks to predict the presence of spam in 
email by a factor of 35.5%, since it correctly identified 69.5% of safe URLs. In addition, the study’s 56% 
success rate for detecting unwanted content is extremely close to this thesis’ 55.5% for detecting 
malicious URLs [5]. This is an encouraging result as future studies will likely be able to improve this 
proof-of-concept application and bring its effectiveness to a point that is reliable enough for use in real-
world environments. 
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7 
Future Work 
 
Although the application for this thesis was purposely developed as a proof-of-concept, the application 
is usable as-is by anyone with a Facebook account. Still, there are many ways in which this application 
can be improved upon that will benefit its functionality, performance, and effectiveness. The following 
sections describe some of the improvements that can be made by future work. 
 
7.1 Bugs 
While the code for this application did undergo a fairly extensive period of testing, several bugs that still 
exist became apparent while the results of the tests were being analyzed. First, occasionally a test might 
return a score of the $NO_SCORE variable, which indicates that an error occurred for that particular 
test. This is a difficult problem to test for, since it appears only a very select number of URLs will trigger 
the bug. Second, even with the use of the Long URL Please API, several shortened URLs were not 
correctly scored given their obfuscated nature. Although some of the URLs affected by this problem 
were created with a service not supported by the Long URL Please API, there were several results which 
might be considered invalid due to the use of popular shortening services like bit.ly. More testing with 
the Long URL Please API must be performed before it can be understood why these links were not 
reversed into their full form correctly. Finally, there is potentially a bug in the way that score reports are 
generated and stored on the server, since the testing period only yielded reports from eight individuals 
out of the 22 who approved the application for use on their Facebook profiles. While this may be a 
legitimate software flaw or simply a lack of good communication with the user about what is required, 
more verbose logging needs to be done to understand why score reports were not generated for certain 
trials. 
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7.2 Functionality 
Perhaps the most promising of the potential improvements to this project is the ability to add more 
tests to the application’s functionality. Currently, the application puts each URL through a series of 15 
tests, seven of which are directly related to social network-based data. However, there certainly exists 
the potential for the creation of an even greater of number of tests, which would likely improve the 
effectiveness of the application as a whole. In addition, as the APIs for sites like Facebook and Twitter 
continue to evolve, this will certainly make more interesting and useful tests possible.  
 
7.3 Interface Design 
Because this application was designed to be a proof-of-concept, its development lacked the significant 
front-end design considerations that would be found in typical production software. Certainly, the 
application has plenty of room to improve in this area. Interface design changes could likely lead to a 
more user-friendly experience that allows users to grasp the concept and execution of the software 
more easily. 
 
7.4 Platform Choice 
Although the  Facebook application platform was certainly ideal for proving the concept of this thesis 
while simultaneously having the best chance for in-depth access to significant amounts of social 
networking data, it may not be the best choice for an effective security tool used in real-world 
situations. Instead, future projects may consider porting the application to a platform with better insight 
into the user’s Internet habits, such as a desktop application or a browser plugin. Making this change 
would allow the application to more effectively monitor web content from sources other than the 
Facebook News Feed, yet continue to use APIs to access the social networking data that is critical to the 
success of this concept. 
 
7.5 Machine Learning 
It is likely that the inclusion of a machine learning algorithm with this application would be useful in 
improving the scoring mechanism. Currently, an arbitrary scoring threshold must be chosen based on 
the median scores for data with a known safe or malicious rating. While this is suitable for a proof-of-
concept application, a future production version could use machine learning to dynamically determine 
the scoring threshold to be used in making an assumption on whether a link is safe or malicious. This 
51 
 
decision would be based on a learning process that uses known data sets to develop an ideal scoring 
threshold for the environment in which the application is executed. It is likely that this process would 
significantly improve the scoring algorithm and produce more effective results, while allowing for 
customized scoring thresholds for different users. 
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A 
Source Code – index.php 
<?php 
/* 
* Author: Mike Robertson 
* Application: Link Checker 
* File: 'index.php'  
*   The main application page. Upon loading, the script browses through the  
*   last 100 posts in a user's stream and uses a regular expression to find  
*   URLs that may have been posted there. While it does this search, it also  
*   keeps track of the number of stream posts from each user's friend  
*   (regardless of whether it contains a link or not). These totals  
*   are added to a database (contacts_<user_id>) so that we can keep track of  
*   the relative frequency that a user communicates with each of their  
*   friends. This information is used as chatsOften function in  
*   fb-checks.php, and is unfortunately not available at this time through  
*   the Facebook API.  
* 
*  If the user has never used the application before (or has deleted their 
*     cookie for the site), they are prompted to select one of their friend  
*     lists as a group of "trusted" users. If a group is selected (the user  
*     can choose a value of "none"), links sent by friends in this trusted  
*     group are given a bonus point by the isInTrustedList function in fb- 
*     checks.php. The idea in selecting this list is to place extra trust in  
*     links sent by certain friends (i.e. family members or tech savvy people 
*     who are unlikely to send you a malicious link). 
*  
* Each link that is found in the stream (both the post's text and  
*     attachments are checked) is added to an array which is sent, along with 
*     some metadata, to the startScanner function in scanner.php. This  
*     function will run the actual checks and create the report output. Once 
*     the scan completes, this script will exit. 
* 
* This file is part of Link Checker. 
* 
*    Link Checker is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 
*    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
*    the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 
* (at your option) any later version. 
* 
*    Link Checker is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
*    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
*    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
*    GNU General Public License for more details. 
* 
*    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
*    along with Link Checker.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
*/  
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require_once '/data/www/api/facebook.php'; // Facebook API 
include 'scanner.php';    // Used to start the scanning   
include '/data/www/linkchecker.conf';  // The global config file 
 
// True if the "trusted_group" value is set in the HTTP POST data  
// (i.e. the user has selected a trusted group and submitted the form) 
if(isset($_POST["trusted_group"])) { 
 // Allows IE to accept our 3rd party cookie by adding a  
// "compact privacy policy" 
 // See [27] for more details 
 header("P3P: CP=\"CAO PSA OUR\""); 
 // Set a 30 day cookie to remember the user's trusted friend list  
// and reload the page to continue 
 setcookie("trusted_group", $_POST["trusted_group"],  
time()+60*60*24*30); 
 echo "<script>window.location.href=window.location.href;</script>"; 
} 
 
// Initialize the Facebook object for API calls 
$facebook = new Facebook($appapikey, $appsecret); 
// An array of links found in the user's stream 
$links = array(); 
 
// Expands shortened URLs using the Long URL Please API at [9] 
// Returns: The expanded URL string if the URL was shortened 
//   false if the URL was not shortened 
function expandURL($url) { 
 // Pattern adapted from Long URL Please Firefox extension [10] 
 // We will only try to shorten the link if it matches the same pattern  
// used by the Long URL Please service (these are supported services) 
 // This saves on the number of requests we need to make to their API 
 $pattern =  
"/(http(s?):\/\/(307\.to|adjix\.com|b23\.ru|bacn\.me|bit\.ly|bloa
t\.me|budurl\.com|cli\.gs|clipurl\.us|cort\.as|digg\.com|dwarfurl
\.com|fb\.me|ff\.im|fff\.to|href\.in|idek\.net|is\.gd|j\.mp|kl\.a
m|korta\.nu|lin\.cr|ln\s\.net|loopt\.us|lost\.in|memurl\.com|merk
y\.de|migre\.me|moourl\.com|nanourl\.se|om\.ly|ow\.ly|peaurl\.com
|ping\.fm|piurl\.com|plurl\.me|pnt\.me|poprl\.com|post\.ly|rde\.m
e|reallytinyurl\.com|redir\.ec|retwt\.me|rubyurl\.com|short\.ie|s
hort\.to|smallr\.com|sn\.im|sn\.vc|snipr\.com|snipurl\.com|snurl\
.com|su\.pr|tiny\.cc|tinysong\.com|tinyurl\.com|togoto\.us|tr\.im
|tra\.kz|trg\.li|twurl\.cc|twurl\.nl|u\.mavrev\.com|u\.nu|ur1\.ca
|url\.az|url\.ie|urlx\.ie|w34\.us|xrl\.us|yep\.it|zi\.ma|zurl\.ws
)\/[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)|((http(s?):\/\/[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.notlong\.com) 
  |(http(s?):\/\/[a-zA-Z0- 
9_]+\.qlnk\.net)|(http(s?):\/\/chilp\.it\/[?][a-zA-Z0-9_-]+) 
  |(http(s?):\/\/goo\.gl\/fb\/[a-zA-Z0-9_- 
]+)|(http(s?):\/\/trim\.li\/nk\/[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+) 
  |(http(s?):\/\/url4\.eu\/[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+))[\/]?/"; 
   
 $num = preg_match_all($pattern, $url, $matches); 
 // True if the URL matches a pattern supported by Long URL Please 
 if($num > 0) { 
  $matches = $matches[0]; 
  foreach($matches as $match) { 
   // Setup a cURL instance to shorten the URL using the Long  
// URL Please API 
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   $ch = curl_init("http://www.longurlplease.com/api/v1.1?q="  
. $url); 
   // Return the results as an associative array,  
// rather than printing them to stdout 
   curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true); 
    
   // Execute the API call 
   $response = curl_exec($ch); 
    
   // Decode the JSON results into something we can  
// parse with PHP 
   $results = json_decode($response); 
    
   // Return the full URL 
   return $results->$url; 
  } 
 } 
  
 // Return false if the URL was not shortened 
 return false; 
} 
 
// Checks links[] to see if a given link already exists in it 
// to avoid scanning the same link twice. 
// A link is considered a duplicate if its hash exists > 1 time 
// in a single post. 
// Returns: 1 if the link is a duplicate 
//   0 if the link is not a duplicate 
function checkForDupe($hash, $postID) { 
 $GLOBALS["links"]; 
  
 foreach($GLOBALS["links"] as $link) { 
  $hasHash = in_array($hash, $link); 
  
  if($hasHash) { 
   $hasPost = in_array($postID, $link); 
   if($hasPost) 
    return 1; 
   else 
    continue; 
  } 
  else 
   continue; 
 } 
 return 0; 
} 
 
 
// Ask the user for permission to access their stream and store their user ID 
$user_id = $facebook->require_login($required_permissions = 'read_stream'); 
 
// True if the user has not yet chosen a trusted friend list 
if(!isset($_COOKIE["trusted_group"])) { 
 echo "<span id=\"message\"><p>If you have a group of friends who you  
trust not to send you malicious links (i.e. links to viruses,  
spyware, fraud sites, etc.), please select it from the list 
below. Otherwise, select None.  
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  Once you have made your choice, please click the Save button to  
start the test.</p></span>"; 
 echo "<form action=\"index.php\" method=\"post\"><select  
name=\"trusted_group\"><option value=\"0\"  
selected>None</option>"; 
 
 // Returns a list of the user's friend lists, which is used to create  
// the drop-down menu 
 $lists = $facebook->api_client->friends_getLists(); 
 if(is_array($lists)) { 
  foreach($lists as $list) 
   echo "<option value=\"" . $list["flid"] . "\">" .  
$list["name"] . "</option>"; 
 } 
 else 
  echo "<script>document.getElementById('message').innerHTML =  
'There was an error getting your lists. Please select None 
for your trusted list or contact the developer to report 
this error.';</script>"; 
 echo "</select><br /><input type=\"submit\" value=\"Save\"  
name=\"save\" /></form>"; 
 exit(0); 
} 
 
// Otherwise, run the application 
else { 
 // Tell the user the test is complete (this will only display once the  
// scans have finished) 
 echo "<b>The test is complete. See below for the scan report.</b><br  
/><br />"; 
  
 // Print some basic user information (user ID and number of friends) 
 echo "User: " . $user_id . "<br />"; 
 $friends = $facebook->api_client->friends_get(); 
 $numFriends = count($friends); 
 echo "Friends: " . $numFriends . "<br /><br />"; 
 
 // Get the current time, which is stored in a database to know when we  
// last scanned the stream 
 $currentTime = time(); 
  
 // Connect to the database and select the linkchecker database. 
 // Variables are accessed from the global config file 
 $result = mysql_connect($server, $username, $password); 
 if(!$result) 
  die("Could not connect to database."); 
 $result = mysql_select_db($contact_database); 
 if(!$result) 
  die("Could not open contact_database."); 
   
 // Find the last time the user's stream was scanned 
 $query = "SELECT updateTime FROM updateTime WHERE userID =  
'" . $user_id . "'"; 
 $response = mysql_query($query); 
 $result = mysql_fetch_assoc($response); 
  
 // Set lastUpdate to be the time (in epoch) the stream was last  
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  // scanned, or 0 if it's never been scanned 
 $lastUpdate = 0; 
 if(isset($result["updateTime"])) 
  $lastUpdate = $result["updateTime"]; 
   
 // Now that we have the latest update time, update the database with  
// the current time since the stream is being scanned now 
 $query = "INSERT INTO updateTime (userID, updatetime) VALUES ('" .  
$user_id . "', '" . $currentTime . "') ON DUPLICATE KEY 
UPDATE updatetime='" . $currentTime . "'"; 
 $result = mysql_query($query); 
 
 // Read the last 100 posts of the user's stream 
 $stream = $facebook->api_client->stream_get($user_id, '', '', '',  
'100', '', ''); 
 
 // Loop through each post in the stream 
 foreach($stream["posts"] as $post) { 
  
  if(isset($post["created_time"])) { 
   // If we have not counted this post before, add +1 to the  
// user's contact frequency with this friend 
   if($post["created_time"] > $lastUpdate) { 
    $query = "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS contacts_" .  
$user_id . " (friendID varchar(32) not null 
primary key, contactCount int default '0')"; 
    $response = mysql_query($query); 
    if(!$response) 
     die("Could not create the database."); 
    $query = "INSERT INTO contacts_" . $user_id . "  
(friendID, contactCount) VALUES ('" . 
$post["source_id"] . "', '1') ON DUPLICATE KEY 
UPDATE contactCount=contactCount+1";  
    $response = mysql_query($query); 
    if(!$response) 
     die("Could not update the database."); 
   } 
   // Skip this link if it has already been counted & scanned 
   else 
    continue; 
  } 
   
  // Check the message text for links 
  if(isset($post["message"])) { 
   // Matches all of the URLs in a post 
   $pattern = "/\b(http:\/\/|https:\/\/|www\.)(?:[a-zA-Z0-9\- 
])+(@|\.){1}[a-zA-Z0-9\-]+(?:\/?[a-zA-Z0-9\$\-
_\.\+!\*'\(\,):@=&\?])*\b/"; 
   $num = preg_match_all($pattern, $post["message"],  
$matches); 
    
   // True if any URLs were found 
   if($num > 0) { 
    $matches = $matches[0]; 
    foreach($matches as $match) { 
     if(isset($match[0])) { 
      // Enable for debugging only 
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      //echo "Message: " . $match . "<br  
// />Posted by: " . $post["source_id"] 
// . "<br />Post #: " .  
// $post["post_id"]. "<br />"; 
       
      // Expand the URL if it is shortened 
      $result = expandURL($match); 
      if($result != false) 
       $match = $result; 
       
      // Check to make sure the link is not a  
// duplicate in this post 
      $isDupe = checkForDupe(md5($match),  
$post["post_id"]); 
       
      // Enable for debugging only 
      //echo "Is Duplicate: " . $isDupe . "<br  
//  /><br />"; 
       
      // True if the link is not a duplicate 
      if($isDupe == 0) 
       // Array format: [0] => URL hash,  
[1] => URL, [2] => author's user 
ID, [3] => post ID, [4] => score 
       $links[] = array(md5($match),  
$match, $post["source_id"], 
$post["post_id"], 0); 
     } 
    } 
   } 
  } 
   
  // Check the message attachment for links 
  if(isset($post["attachment"])) { 
   $attachment = $post["attachment"]; 
   if(isset($attachment["media"]) &&  
is_array($attachment["media"])) { 
    foreach($attachment["media"] as $data) { 
     if(isset($data["type"])) { 
      if($data["type"] == "link") { 
       $decoded_link = ""; 
       // Links posted as attachments of  
// applications other than Facebook 
// will be raw URLs 
       if(strstr($data["href"],  
"http://www.facebook.com/l.ph
p?") == false) { 
        // Enable for debugging only 
        //echo "Link: " .  
// $data["href"] . "<br  
// />"; 
         
        $url = $data["href"]; 
       } 
       // Links posted as Facebook  
// attachments will be encoded as a 
// URL GET parameter 
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       else { 
        $query_data =  
parse_url($data["href"]
, PHP_URL_QUERY); 
        $url_param = explode("&",  
$query_data); 
        $raw_link =  
substr($url_param[0], 
2); 
         
        // Requires 2 calls to  
// urldecode (1st decodes the  
// "%", 2nd decodes the other  
// characters) 
$decoded_link =  
urldecode(urldecode($ra
w_link)); 
         
        // Enable for debugging only 
        //echo "Link: " .  
//  $decoded_link . "<br  
//  />"; 
         
        $url = $decoded_link; 
       } 
        
       // Enable for debugging only 
       //echo "Posted by: " .  
//  $post["source_id"] . "<br  
// />"; 
       //echo "Post #: " .  
//  $post["post_id"] . "<br />"; 
       
       // Expand the URL if it is  
// shortened 
       $result = expandURL($url); 
       if($result != false) 
        $url = $result; 
        
       // Check to make sure the link is  
// not a duplicate for this post 
       $isDupe = checkForDupe(md5($url),  
$post["post_id"]); 
        
       // Enable for debugging only 
       //echo "Is Duplicate: " . $isDupe .  
//  "<br /><br />"; 
        
       // True if the link is not a  
// duplicate 
       if($isDupe == 0) 
        // Array format: [0] => URL  
// hash, [1] => URL, [2] =>  
// author's user ID, [3] =>  
// post ID, [4] => score 
        $links[] = array(md5($url),  
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$url, 
$post["source_id"], 
$post["post_id"], 0); 
      } 
     } 
    } 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 
 // Get the total contact frequency we have seen 
 $query = "SELECT SUM(contactCount) AS numContacts FROM contacts_" .  
$user_id; 
 $response = mysql_query($query); 
 $result = mysql_fetch_assoc($response); 
 $numContacts = -1; 
 if(isset($result["numContacts"])) 
  $numContacts = $result["numContacts"]; 
  
 // Start the scan if any links were found 
 if(count($links) > 0) 
  startScanner($user_id, $numFriends, $links, $facebook,  
$numContacts); 
} 
 
mysql_close(); 
 
exit(0); 
 
?> 
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B 
Source Code – scanner.php 
 
<?php 
/* 
* Author: Mike Robertson 
* Application: Link Checker 
* File: 'scanner.php'  
*   Initiates all of the scanning functions and creates the scan report.  
* Adding a scan to this application only requires that the developer add  
*  the following lines: 
* 
*  $result = <scan_function>; 
*  echo "<scan_name>: " . $result . "<br />"; 
*  $output .= "^" . $result; 
*  $score += $result; 
* 
* Tests should return either GOOD_SCORE or BAD_SCORE, or a weighted  
* version of it. Tests can also return NO_SCORE on an error. 
* 
* The scan report is both printed to the screen and stored as a delimited  
* text file on the server. 
* The text file has the following format for easy scripting/importing  
* (data is on a single line, but contains breaks here for formatting): 
* 
* user_id^numFriends^hash^url^author_id^post_id^senderIsFriend^hasMutual 
*  Friends^attendsEvents^photoIsTagged 
*  ^chatsOften^isInTrustedList^serverLocation^domainAge^ 
*  suspiciousCharacters^nonStandardPort^manySubdomains^hasIPAddress 
*  ^usesSSL^checkSafeBrowsing^twitterSearch^finalScore\r\n 
* 
* This file is part of Link Checker. 
* 
*    Link Checker is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 
*    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
*    the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 
*    (at your option) any later version. 
* 
*    Link Checker is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
*    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
*    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
*    GNU General Public License for more details. 
* 
*    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
*    along with Link Checker.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
*/  
 
include 'fb-checks.php';   // Facebook-related scans 
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include 'url-checks.php';   // URL-related scans 
include '/data/www/linkchecker.conf'; // The global config file 
 
 
// This is the main function that calls all of the checks and creates the  
// report. 
// It is called by both index.php and manual-scan.php 
function startScanner($user_id, $numFriends, $links, $facebook, $numContacts) 
{ 
 // Initialize the scan score to 0 and get the current time 
 $score = 0; 
 $startTime = time(); 
  
 // Loop through all of the links in links[] 
 foreach($links as $link) { 
  
  // Add some basic information to the report 
  $output = $user_id . "^" . $numFriends; 
  echo "Hash: " . $link[0] . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $link[0]; 
  echo "URL: " . $link[1] . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $link[1]; 
  echo "Author: " . $link[2] . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $link[2]; 
  echo "Post: " . $link[3] . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $link[3]; 
   
  // senderIsFriend (fb-checks.php): Checks to see if the author of  
// the post is a friend of the user 
  // Returns: GOOD_SCORE if the author is a friend of the user,  
// BAD_SCORE if the author is not a friend of the user 
  $result = senderIsFriend($user_id, $link[2], $facebook);  
  echo "senderIsFriend: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
   
  // hasMutualFriends (fb-checks.php): Checks the number of mutual  
// friends the user has with the author. 
  // This is based on research by [5] 
  // Returns: GOOD_SCORE if the author has > NETWORK_CLUSTER_MAX  
// mutual friends with the author 
  //   BAD_SCORE if the author has <  
//   NETWORK_CLUSTER_MIN mutual friends with the author 
  //   GOOD_SCORE/2 if the author has >  
//   NETWORK_CLUSTER_MAX/2 mutual friends with the author 
  //   BAD_SCORE/2 if the author has <  
//   NETWORK_CLUSTER_MAX/2 mutual friends with the author 
  //   BAD_SCORE if the author has 0 mutual friends  
//   with the author 
  $result = hasMutualFriends($user_id, $link[2], $facebook,  
$numFriends); 
  echo "hasMutualFriends: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
   
  // attendsEvents (fb-checks.php): Checks to see if the user is  
//  attending/has attended any events with the author. 
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  // The idea is that the user does not attend events with  
// malicious users. 
  // Returns: GOOD_SCORE if the author is attending/has attended at  
// least 1 event with the user, otherwise NO_SCORE 
  $result = attendsEvents($user_id, $link[2], $facebook); 
  echo "attendsEvents: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
   
  // photoIsTagged (fb-checks.php): Checks to see if the user is  
// tagged in any photos with the author. The idea is 
  // that the user does not appear in pictures with malicious  
// users. 
  // Returns: GOOD_SCORE if the user is tagged in a photo with the  
// author, otherwise BAD_SCORE 
  // Notes: This test only works for photos owned by the user, due  
// to restrictions with the Facebook API 
  $result = photoIsTagged($user_id, $link[2], $facebook); 
  echo "photoIsTagged: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
   
  // chatsOften (fb-checks.php): Checks to see if the user sees  
// posts by the author often. The idea is that 
  // a link which comes from an author who does not post links  
// often may be malicious. 
  // Returns: GOOD_SCORE if the author posts with a frequency >=  
//  total number of contacts*CONTACT_THRESHOLD.  
  //  BAD_SCORE if the author posts with a frequency <  
//  total number of contacts*CONTACT_THRESHOLD. 
  //  BAD_SCORE*5 if the author has never posted. 
  $result = chatsOften($user_id, $link[2], $numContacts); 
  echo "chatsOften: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
   
  // isInTrustedList (fb-checks.php): Checks to see if the author  
// is in the user's trusted friend list that they 
  // selected when the application started. 
  // Returns: NO_SCORE if the user did not select a trusted list,  
// GOOD_SCORE if the author is in the trusted list, 
  // BAD_SCORE if the author is not in the trusted list 
  $result = isInTrustedList($user_id, $link[2], $facebook); 
  echo "isInTrustedList: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
   
  // serverLocation (url-checks.php): Checks the geographic  
// location of the web server. 
  // Returns: BAD_SCORE if the server is located in a country  
// listed in untrustedCountries[] (linkchecker.conf) 
  //  GOOD_SCORE if the server is not located in a country  
// listed in untrustedCountries[] (linkchecker.conf) 
  $result = serverLocation($link[1]); 
  echo "serverLocation: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
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  // domainAge (url-checks.php): Checks the age of the domain name. 
  // Returns: GOOD_SCORE*2 if the domain age is >= 3 years old 
  //   GOOD_SCORE if the domain age is between 1 year  
//   (inclusive) and 3 years (exclusive) old 
  //  BAD_SCORE if the domain age is between 2 months  
//   (inclusive) and 1 year (exclusive) old 
  // Based on data [19] 
  //  BAD_SCORE*2 if the domain age is between 2 days  
//   (inclusive) and 2 months (exclusive) old 
  // Based on data from [2] 
  //  BAD_SCORE*10 if the domain age is < 2 days old  
  $result = domainAge($link[1]); 
  echo "domainAge: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
   
  // suspiciousCharacters (url-checks.php): Checks the URL for the  
// presence of "@" or many (> 1) "-" characters. 
  // Returns: BAD_SCORE if the URL contains >1 "-" in the host  
// portion of the URL 
  // BAD_SCORE if the URL contains "@" 
  // GOOD_SCORE if the URL does not contain either of these  
// conditions 
  $result = suspiciousCharacters($link[1]); 
  echo "suspiciousCharacters: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
   
  // nonStandardPort (url-checks.php): Checks to see if the website  
// is being hosted on a non-standard port. Non-standard ports 
  // are considered to be anything other than TCP/80 or TCP/443. 
  // Returns: GOOD_SCORE if port 80 or 443 is specified in the URL,  
// or if no port is specified (browser will imply 80 or 443  
//  based on the scheme [i.e. http or https]) 
  //  BAD_SCORE if a port other than 80 or 443 is specified  
//  in the URL 
  $result = nonStandardPort($link[1]); 
  echo "nonStandardPort: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
   
  // manySubdomains (url-checks.php): Checks the URL for the  
// presence of many subdomains (> 3). Most legitimate sites 
  // will keep the amount of subdomains to 3 or less for the  
// sake of ease for their visitors (i.e. mycourses.rit.edu, 
  // mail.google.com, etc.). However, malicious sites may use  
// many subdomains to trick visitors by using subdomains 
  // that are recognizable as other sites (i.e.  
// www.microsoft.com.test.net). 
  // Returns: BAD_SCORE if the URL contains > 3 subdomains 
  //  GOOD_SCORE if the URL cotains <= 3 subdomains 
  $result = manySubdomains($link[1]); 
  echo "manySubdomains: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
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  // hasIPAddress (url-checks.php): Checks the URL for the use of  
// IP address instead of domain name. Few legitimate sites 
  // will neglect to register a domain name for their site since  
// it makes it easier to remember for users. Malicious  
  // sites that will likely be short lived may not go to the  
// trouble of registering a domain name. 
  // Returns: BAD_SCORE if the URL contains an IP address 
  //  GOOD_SCORE if the URL does not contain an IP address 
  $result = hasIPAddress($link[1]); 
  echo "hasIPAddress: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
   
  // usesSSL (url-checks.php): Checks to see if the URL is using  
// HTTP or HTTPS. Few malicious sites will take the time 
  // to setup an SSL version of their site. In addition, this  
// test considers a site built with SSL as more secure. 
  // Returns: BAD_SCORE if the URL uses a scheme of HTTP 
  //  GOOD_SCORE if the URL uses a scheme of HTTPS 
  $result = usesSSL($link[1]); 
  echo "usesSSL: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
   
  // checkSafeBrowsing (url-checks.php): Checks the URL hash  
// against the Google Safe Browsing databases (both blacklist  
// and malware) to see if the site is known to be malicious.  
  // Returns: BAD_SCORE*100 if the site's hash exists in either the  
//   blacklist or malware Safe Browsing lists 
  //   GOOD_SCORE if the site's hash does not exist in  
//   either the blacklist or malware Safe Browsing  
//   lists 
  $result = checkSafeBrowsing($link[1]); 
  echo "checkSafeBrowsing: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
   
  // twitterSearch (url-checks.php): Searches Twitter for the full  
// URL and, if it is not found, the domain used in the URL to  
// see if it is being shared there. The idea is that popular  
// links and well-known domains should appear in Twitter  
// search results. Malicious or obscure sites should not  
// appear in Twitter search results. 
  // Returns: GOOD_SCORE*2 if the full link appears on Twitter 
  //  GOOD_SCORE if the domain used in the link appears on  
//   Twitter (i.e. rit.edu) 
  //  BAD_SCORE if neither the full link or domain appears  
//   on Twitter 
  // Notes: This function relies on Twitter's malicious URL  
// filtering. The effectiveness of this function, however,  
  // depends on the effectiveness of these filters since a  
// malicious link that is not filtered by 
  // Twitter will receive a good score for this test.  
  $result = twitterSearch($link[1]); 
  echo "twitterSearch: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $result; 
  $score += $result; 
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  echo "Score: " . $score . "<br /><br />"; 
  $output .= "^" . $score; 
   
  $output .= "\r\n"; 
   
  // Save the report in a file called  
// /data/www/results/<user_id>_<start_time>.dat 
  $f = fopen($GLOBALS["report_dir"] . $user_id . "_" . $startTime .  
".dat", "a"); 
   
  // output format:  
// user_id^numFriends^hash^url^author_id^post_id^ 
// senderIsFriend^hasMutualFriends^attendsEvents^photoIsTagged 
  // ^chatsOften^isInTrustedList^serverLocation^domainAge 
//  ^suspiciousCharacters^nonStandardPort^manySubdomains 
// ^hasIPAddress^usesSSL^checkSafeBrowsing^twitterSearch 
// ^finalScore\r\n 
  fwrite($f, $output); 
  fclose($f); 
   
  // Reset the score for the next link that will be scanned 
  $score = 0; 
 } 
} 
 
?> 
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C 
Source Code – fb-checks.php 
 
<?php 
/* 
* Author: Mike Robertson 
* Application: Link Checker 
* File: 'fb-checks.php'  
*   Provides scanning functions for all Facebook-related checks. Each  
* function in this script can accept any parameters  
* needed to run the tests. At the conclusion of the test, the function  
* should return GOOD_SCORE, BAD_SCORE, or a weighted 
* version of these variables. NO_SCORE can also be returned on an error  
* or other special case where the results are inconclusive. 
* See the comments above each function for a description of its test(s). 
* 
* This file is part of Link Checker. 
* 
*   Link Checker is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 
*    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
*    the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 
*    (at your option) any later version. 
* 
*    Link Checker is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
*    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
*    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
*    GNU General Public License for more details. 
* 
*    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
*    along with Link Checker.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
*/  
 
// Checks to see if the author of the post is a friend of the user 
// Returns: GOOD_SCORE if the author is a friend of the user, BAD_SCORE if  
// the author is not a friend of the user 
function senderIsFriend($user_id, $senderID, $facebook) { 
 // Use the Facebook API to see if user_id and senderID are friends 
 $result = $facebook->api_client->friends_areFriends($user_id,  
$senderID); 
  
 if(is_array($result)) { 
  $areFriends = $result[0]; 
  if(isset($areFriends["are_friends"])) { 
   // True if the users are friends 
   if($areFriends["are_friends"] == 1) 
    return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
   // True if the users are not friends 
   elseif($areFriends["are_friends"] == 0) 
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    return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
   // Inconclusive/error 
   else  
    return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
  } 
  else 
   return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
 } 
 else  
  return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
} 
 
// Checks the number of mutual friends the user has with the author. 
//  This is based on research by [5] 
// Returns: GOOD_SCORE if the author has > NETWORK_CLUSTER_MAX mutual friends  
//   with the author 
//   BAD_SCORE if the author has < NETWORK_CLUSTER_MIN mutual friends  
//   with the author 
//   GOOD_SCORE/2 if the author has > NETWORK_CLUSTER_MAX/2 mutual  
//   friends with the author 
//   BAD_SCORE/2 if the author has < NETWORK_CLUSTER_MAX/2 mutual  
//   friends with the author 
//   BAD_SCORE if the author has 0 mutual friends with the author 
function hasMutualFriends($user_id, $senderID, $facebook, $numFriends) { 
  
 // Recommended clustering coefficients by [5] 
 $NETWORK_CLUSTER_MAX = $numFriends * 0.10; 
 $NETWORK_CLUSTER_MIN = $numFriends * 0.01; 
 
 // Use the API to get a list of the users' mutual friends 
 $result = $facebook->api_client->friends_getMutualFriends($senderID,  
$user_id); 
  
 // Evaluates to true if users have >= 1 mutual friends 
 if(is_array($result)) { 
  // Count the number of mutual friends 
  $numMutualFriends = count($result); 
   
  // True if the number of mutual friends is > 10% of the user's  
// total friends 
  if($numMutualFriends > $NETWORK_CLUSTER_MAX) 
   return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
  // True if the number of mutual friends < 1% of the user's total  
// friends 
  elseif($numMutualFriends < $NETWORK_CLUSTER_MIN) 
   return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
  // True if the number of mutual friends is between 5% and 10% of  
// the user's total friends 
  elseif($numMutualFriends > ($NETWORK_CLUSTER_MAX/2)) 
   return ($GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]/2); 
  // True if the number of mutual friends is between 1% and 5% of  
// the user's total friends 
  elseif($numMutualFriends < ($NETWORK_CLUSTER_MAX/2)) 
   return ($GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]/2); 
  else 
   return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
 } 
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 // Evaluates to true if users have 0 mutual friends 
 else 
  return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
} 
 
// Checks to see if the user is attending/has attended any events with the  
// author. The idea is that the user does not attend events with malicious  
// users. 
// Returns: GOOD_SCORE if the author is attending/has attended at least 1  
// event with the user, otherwise NO_SCORE 
function attendsEvents($user_id, $senderID, $facebook) { 
 // Use the API to get a list of events the user has attended w/ sender 
 $query = "SELECT eid FROM event_member WHERE uid = \"" . $user_id . "\"  
AND rsvp_status = \"attending\" AND eid IN (SELECT eid FROM 
event_member WHERE uid = \"" . $senderID . "\" AND rsvp_status = 
\"attending\")"; 
 $result = $facebook->api_client->fql_query($query); 
  
 if(is_array($result)) { 
  // True if the user has attended at least 1 event with the sender 
  if(count($result) > 0) 
   return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
  else 
   return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
 } 
 // Return NO_SCORE if the user has not attended any events w/ sender 
 // We cannot be sure that this means the sender is malicious (users  
// could be geographically separated) 
 else 
  return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
} 
 
// Checks to see if the user is tagged in any photos with the author. The  
// idea is that the user does not appear in pictures with malicious users. 
// Returns: GOOD_SCORE if the user is tagged in a photo with the author,  
//  otherwise BAD_SCORE 
// Notes: This test only works for photos owned by the user, due to  
//  restrictions with the Facebook API 
function photoIsTagged($user_id, $senderID, $facebook) { 
 // Get a list of the photos owned by the user that are tagged with both  
// the user and the sender  
 $query = "SELECT pid FROM photo_tag WHERE subject=\"" . $user_id . "\"  
AND pid IN (SELECT pid FROM photo_tag WHERE subject=\"" . 
$senderID . "\")"; 
 $result = $facebook->api_client->fql_query($query); 
  
 // Return GOOD_SCORE if there is a picture tagged with both the user  
// and sender 
 // Return BAD_SCORE if there are no pictures that match this criteria 
 if(is_array($result)) { 
  if(count($result) > 0) 
   return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
  else 
   return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
 } 
 else 
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  return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
} 
 
// Checks to see if the user sees posts by the author often. The idea is that  
// a link which comes from an author who does not post links often may be  
// malicious. 
// Returns: GOOD_SCORE if the author posts with a frequency >= total number  
//   of contacts*CONTACT_THRESHOLD.  
//  BAD_SCORE if the author posts with a frequency < total number of  
//   contacts*CONTACT_THRESHOLD. 
//  BAD_SCORE*5 if the author has never posted. 
function chatsOften($user_id, $senderID, $numContacts) { 
 // The sender must post >= to this percent of the total posts the user  
// sees to be considered safe 
 $CONTACT_THRESHOLD = 0.10; 
  
 // Set the database to the contact database 
 $result = mysql_select_db($GLOBALS["contact_database"]); 
 if(!$result) { 
  echo "result: " . $result . "<br />"; 
  return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
 } 
  
 // Get the number of posts the user has seen from this sender 
 $query = "SELECT contactCount FROM contacts_" . $user_id . " WHERE  
friendID='" . $senderID . "'"; 
 $response = mysql_query($query); 
 $result = mysql_fetch_assoc($response); 
  
 // Return BAD_SCORE*5 if the sender has never posted 
 if(!$result) 
  return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]*5; 
 
 if(isset($result["contactCount"])) { 
  // True if this sender has posted >= CONTACT_THRESHOLD% of the  
// posts seen by the user 
  if($result["contactCount"] >= $numContacts*$CONTACT_THRESHOLD) 
   return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
  // Return BAD_SCORE*5 if the sender has never posted 
  elseif($result["contactCount"] <= 1) 
   return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]*5; 
  // Return BAD_SCORE if the sender has posted more than once but <  
// CONTACT_THRESHOLD% of the posts seen by the user 
  else 
   return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
 } 
 else { 
  echo "arr " . $result . "<br />"; 
  return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
 } 
} 
 
// Checks to see if the author is in the user's trusted friend list that they  
// selected when the application started. 
// Returns: NO_SCORE if the user did not select a trusted list, GOOD_SCORE if  
//   the author is in the trusted list, 
//  BAD_SCORE if the author is not in the trusted list 
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function isInTrustedList($user_id, $senderID, $facebook) { 
 // True if the user did not select a trusted group. Test cannot run in  
// this case. 
 if($_COOKIE["trusted_group"] == 0) 
  return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
  
 // Use the API to get a list of members in the trusted list 
 $query = "SELECT uid FROM friendlist_member WHERE flid='" .  
$_COOKIE["trusted_group"] . "'"; 
 $result = $facebook->api_client->fql_query($query); 
  
  
 if(is_array($result)) { 
  // Loop through the list's members 
  foreach($result as $member) { 
   if(isset($member["uid"])) { 
    // True if the sender is in the trusted group 
    if($member["uid"] == $senderID) 
     return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
   } 
  } 
 } 
  
 // Return if the sender was not found in the trusted group 
 return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
} 
?> 
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D 
Source Code – url-checks.php 
 
<?php 
/* 
* Author: Mike Robertson 
* Application: Link Checker 
* File: 'url-checks.php'  
*   Provides scanning functions for all URL-related checks. Each function in  
* this script can accept any parameters needed to run the tests. At the  
* conclusion of the test, the function should return GOOD_SCORE,  
* BAD_SCORE, or a weighted version of these variables. NO_SCORE can also  
* be returned on an error or other special case where the results are  
* inconclusive. See the comments above each function for a description of  
* its test(s). 
* 
* This file is part of Link Checker. 
* 
*    Link Checker is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 
*    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
*    the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 
*    (at your option) any later version. 
* 
*    Link Checker is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
*    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
*    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
*    GNU General Public License for more details. 
* 
*    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
*    along with Link Checker.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
*/ 
 
// Use the MaxMind GeoIP API [26] 
require_once "Net/GeoIP.php";  
 
// Checks the geographic location of the web server. 
// Based on research by [43] and [4]  
// Returns: BAD_SCORE if the server is located in a country listed in  
//   untrustedCountries[] (linkchecker.conf) 
//  GOOD_SCORE if the server is not located in a country listed in  
//   untrustedCountries[] (linkchecker.conf) 
function serverLocation($link) { 
 // Initialize the GeoLite database downloaded from [25] 
 $geoip = Net_GeoIP::getInstance("/data/www/GeoIP.dat"); 
  
 try { 
  // Get the domain from the URL and convert it to an IP address 
  $hostname = parse_url($link); 
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  // Necessary for URLs without a scheme (i.e. http://), parse_url  
// does not work correctly and stores host in ["path"] 
  if(isset($hostname["host"]))  
   $host = $hostname["host"]; 
  else { 
   $link = "http://" . $link; 
   $hostname = parse_url($link); 
   $host = $hostname["host"]; 
  } 
   
  // Use the GeoIP API to determine what country it is located in 
  $country = $geoip->lookupCountryCode(gethostbyname($host)); 
   
  // Loop through the list of untrusted countries 
  foreach($GLOBALS["untrustedCountries"] as $code) { 
   // True if the web server is hosted in an untrusted country 
   if($country == $code) 
    return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
  } 
   
  // If no match was found, the web server is hosted in a trusted  
// country 
  return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
 } 
 catch (Exception $e) { 
  return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
 } 
} 
 
// Checks the age of the domain name. 
// Based on research by [44] and [6]  
// Note: This test may not give expected results for domains in the co.uk  
// namespace. Some whois records do not reveal created dates. 
// Returns: GOOD_SCORE*2 if the domain age is >= 3 years old 
//   GOOD_SCORE if the domain age is between 1 year (inclusive) and 3  
//   years (exclusive) old 
//  BAD_SCORE if the domain age is between 2 months (inclusive) and 1  
//   year (exclusive) old 
//   Based on data from [19] 
//  BAD_SCORE*2 if the domain age is between 2 days (inclusive) and 2  
//   months (exclusive) old 
//   Based on data from [2] 
//  BAD_SCORE*10 if the domain age is < 2 days old  
function domainAge($link) { 
 $YEAR_IN_SECONDS = 31556926;  // 1 year in seconds 
 $DAY_IN_SECONDS = 86400;  // 1 day in seconds 
  
 // An array of months used to determine the month's number (i.e.  
// January = 1) 
 $months = array(1 => "jan", "feb", "mar", "apr", "may", "jun", "jul",  
"aug", "sep", "nov", "dec"); 
  
 $hostname = parse_url($link); 
  
 // Necessary for URLs without a scheme (i.e. http://), parse_url does  
// not work correctly and stores host in ["path"] 
 if(isset($hostname["host"]))  
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  $hostnameExp = explode(".", $hostname["host"]); 
 else { 
  $link = "http://" . $link; 
  $hostname = parse_url($link); 
  $hostnameExp = explode(".", $hostname["host"]); 
 } 
  
 // Get the main domain and TLD of the URL (i.e. rit.edu) 
 $hostSize = count($hostnameExp); 
 $hostname = $hostnameExp[$hostSize-2] . "." .  
$hostnameExp[$hostSize-1]; 
 
 // Check for *.co.uk domains, since this would cause an error without  
// the * subdomain 
 if($hostname == "co.uk") 
  $hostname = $hostnameExp[$hostSize-3] . "." .  
$hostnameExp[$hostSize-2] . "." . 
$hostnameExp[$hostSize-1]; 
  
 // Execute a whois lookup on the domain and extract the dates returned 
 exec("jwhois " . escapeshellarg($hostname) . " | egrep -o [0-9]{2}-[a- 
zA-Z]{3}-[0-9]{4}", $dates, $result); 
  
 if($result == 0) { 
  // Loop through all of the dates from the whois results and  
// convert them to epoch time 
  // Determine which is the oldest date (i.e. smallest epoch  
// number) and consider that the domain's creation date 
  $smallest = "9999999999"; // Works until November 2286 
  if(is_array($dates)) { 
   foreach($dates as $date) { 
    $datePieces = explode("-", $date); 
    $whoisTime = mktime(0, 0, 0,  
array_search(strtolower($datePieces[1]),  
$months), $datePieces[0], $datePieces[2]); 
    if($smallest  > $whoisTime) 
     $smallest = $whoisTime; 
   } 
  } 
  else 
   return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
   
  // Get the current time in epoch 
  $currentDate = time(); 
   
  // True if the domain is >= 3 years old 
  if($smallest <= ($currentDate-($YEAR_IN_SECONDS*3))) 
   return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]*2; 
  // True if the domain is between 1 year (inclusive) and 3 years  
// (exclusive) old 
  if($smallest <= ($currentDate-($YEAR_IN_SECONDS))) 
   return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
  // True if the domain is between 2 months (inclusive) and 1 year  
// (exclusive) old 
  // Based on data from [19] 
  if($smallest <= ($currentDate-($DAY_IN_SECONDS*60))) 
   return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
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  // True if the domain is between 2 days (inclusive) and 2 months  
// (exclusive) old 
  // Based on data from [2] 
  if($smallest <= ($currentDate-($DAY_IN_SECONDS*2))) 
   return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]*2; 
  // True if the domain is < 2 days old 
  else 
   return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]*10; 
 } 
 else 
  return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
} 
 
// Checks the URL for the presence of "@" or many (> 1) "-" characters. 
// Based on research by [44] and [6]  
// Returns: BAD_SCORE if the URL contains >1 "-" in the host portion of URL 
//  BAD_SCORE if the URL contains "@" 
//  GOOD_SCORE if the URL does not contain either of these conditions 
function suspiciousCharacters($link) { 
 // Only consider the host portion of the URL (i.e. www.rit.edu) 
 $hostname = parse_url($link); 
 // Necessary for URLs without a scheme (i.e. http://), parse_url does  
// not work correctly and stores host in ["path"] 
 if(isset($hostname["host"]))  
  $host = $hostname["host"]; 
 else { 
  $link = "http://" . $link; 
  $hostname = parse_url($link); 
  $host = $hostname["host"]; 
 } 
  
 // Count the number of "-" characters 
 preg_match_all("/[-]+/", $host, $hyphens); 
 $numHyphens = 0; 
 if(isset($hyphens[0])) 
  $numHyphens = count($hyphens[0]); 
  
 // True if the number of "-" is > 1 
 if($numHyphens > 1)  
  return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
   
 // Check for "@" 
 $hasAt = strpos($link, "@"); 
  
 // True if the URL contains "@" 
 if($hasAt)  
  return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
  
 // Return a good score if the URL contained no suspicious characters 
 return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
} 
 
// Checks to see if the website is being hosted on a non-standard port. Non- 
// standard ports are considered to be anything other than TCP/80 or  
// TCP/443. 
// Based on research by [43] 
// Returns: GOOD_SCORE if port 80 or 443 is specified in the URL, or if no  
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//   port is specified (browser will imply 80 or 443 based 
//   on the scheme [i.e. http or https]) 
//  BAD_SCORE if a port other than 80 or 443 is specified in the URL 
function nonStandardPort($link) { 
 // Check the URL for a port number (0 - 99,999 are matched, but  
// anything over 65,535 is not a valid port) 
 $result = preg_match("/:[0-9]{1,5}/", $link, $matches); 
 if($result) { 
  // True if the URL contains a port number 
  if(isset($matches[0])) { 
   $port = explode(":", $matches[0]); 
   // True if the port is anything other than 80 or 443 
   if($port[0] != 80 && $port[0] != 443) 
    return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
   else 
    return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
  } 
  else 
   return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
 } 
 else 
  return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
} 
 
// Checks the URL for the presence of many subdomains (> 3). Most legitimate  
// sites will keep the amount of subdomains to 3 or less for the sake of  
// ease for their visitors (i.e. mycourses.rit.edu, mail.google.com,  
// etc.). However, malicious sites may use many subdomains to trick  
// visitors by using subdomains that are recognizable as other 
//  sites (i.e. www.microsoft.com.test.net). 
//  Based on research by [44]  
// Returns: BAD_SCORE if the URL contains > 3 subdomains 
//  GOOD_SCORE if the URL cotains <= 3 subdomains 
//  NO_SCORE if the URL contains an IP address 
function manySubdomains($link) { 
 // Search for an IP address in the URL 
 // Regex adapted from [20] 
 $result = preg_match("/\b(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}\b/", $link, $matches); 
 if($result) { 
  // True if the URL contains an IP address--we should not score  
// this since it would be a false alarm 
  if(isset($matches[0])) 
   return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
 } 
  
 $hostname = parse_url($link); 
 // Necessary for URLs without a scheme (i.e. http://), parse_url does  
// not work correctly and stores host in ["path"] 
 if(isset($hostname["host"]))  
  $host = $hostname["host"]; 
 else { 
  $link = "http://" . $link; 
  $hostname = parse_url($link); 
  $host = $hostname["host"]; 
 } 
  
 // Count the number of subdomains 
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 // Return BAD_SCORE if the count is > 3 
 // Otherwise return GOOD_SCORE 
 $subdomains = explode(".", $host); 
 if(count($subdomains) > 3) 
  return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
 else 
  return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
} 
 
// Checks the URL for the use of IP address instead of domain name. Few  
// legitimate sites will neglect to register a  
//  domain name for their site since it makes it easier to remember for  
// users. Malicious sites that will likely be  
//  short lived may not go to the trouble of registering a domain name. 
// Based on research by [44]  
// Returns: BAD_SCORE if the URL contains an IP address 
//  GOOD_SCORE if the URL does not contain an IP address 
function hasIPAddress($link) { 
 // Search for an IP address in the URL 
 // Regex adapted from [20] 
 $result = preg_match("/\b(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}\b/", $link, $matches); 
  
 if($result) { 
  // True if the URL contains an IP address 
  if(isset($matches[0])) 
   return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
  else 
   return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
 } 
 else 
  return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
} 
 
// Checks to see if the URL is using HTTP or HTTPS. Few malicious sites will  
// take the time to setup an SSL version of their site. In addition, this  
// test considers a site built with SSL as more secure. 
// Based on research by [6]  
// Returns: BAD_SCORE if the URL uses a scheme of HTTP 
//  GOOD_SCORE if the URL uses a scheme of HTTPS 
function usesSSL($link) { 
 // Get the URL scheme (i.e. http or https) 
 $scheme = parse_url($link, PHP_URL_SCHEME); 
  
 // True if the URL uses HTTP 
 if($scheme == "http") 
  return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
 // True if the URL uses HTTPS 
 elseif($scheme == "https") 
  return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
 // True if the scheme is not specified 
 else 
  return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
} 
 
function isInSafeBrowsing($hash) { 
 // Check to see if the URL's hash exists in the blacklist table 
 $query = "SELECT hash FROM blacklist_hash WHERE hash='" . $hash . "'"; 
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 $response = mysql_query($query); 
 if(!$response) 
  return false; 
 $result = mysql_fetch_assoc($response); 
 if(isset($result["hash"])) 
  return true; 
  
 // Check to see if the URL's hash exists in the malware table 
 $query = "SELECT hash FROM malware_hash WHERE hash='" . $hash . "'"; 
 $response = mysql_query($query); 
 if(!$response) 
  return false; 
 $result = mysql_fetch_assoc($response); 
 if(isset($result["hash"])) 
  return true; 
  
 // If we get this far, the hash was not found in either list 
 return false; 
} 
 
// Checks the URL hash against the Google Safe Browsing databases (both  
// blacklist and malware) to see if the site is known to be malicious.  
// Returns: BAD_SCORE*100 if the site's hash exists in either the blacklist  
//   or malware Safe Browsing lists 
//   GOOD_SCORE if the site's hash does not exist in either the  
//   blacklist or malware Safe Browsing lists 
function checkSafeBrowsing($url) { 
 // Set the database to the Safe Browsing database 
 $result = mysql_select_db($GLOBALS["sb_database"]); 
 if(!$result) 
  return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
   
 $parsed = parse_url($url); 
 if(is_array($parsed)) { 
  // Necessary for URLs without a scheme (i.e. http://), parse_url  
// does not work correctly and stores host in ["path"] 
  if(isset($parsed["host"]))  
   $host = $parsed["host"]; 
  else { 
   $url = "http://" . $url; 
   $parsed = parse_url($url); 
   $host = $parsed["host"]; 
  } 
   
  // Hash and chech for various formats of the URL 
  // See [12] for details on formats we should check 
  if(isset($parsed["path"])) { 
   if(isInSafeBrowsing(md5($host . $parsed["path"]))) 
    return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]*100; 
   if(isset($parsed["query"])) { 
    if(isInSafeBrowsing(md5($host . $parsed["path"] . "?"  
. $parsed["query"]))) 
     return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]*100; 
   }  
  } 
  if(isInSafeBrowsing(md5($host . "/"))) 
   return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]*100; 
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  $domains = explode(".", $host); 
  $numDomains = count($domains); 
  $offset = -1; 
  if($numDomains > 5) { 
   $numDomains = 5; 
   $offset = 1; 
  } 
 
  for($x=0; $x < $numDomains-1; $x++) { 
   $link = ""; 
   for($y=$numDomains; $y > $x; $y--) { 
    if($y == $numDomains)  
     $link = $domains[$y+$offset]; 
    else 
     $link = $domains[$y+$offset] . "." . $link; 
   } 
    
   if(isset($parsed["path"])) { 
    if(isInSafeBrowsing(md5($link . $parsed["path"]))) 
     return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]*100; 
    if(isset($parsed["query"])) { 
     if(isInSafeBrowsing(md5($link . $parsed["path"]  
. "?" . $parsed["query"]))) 
      return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]*100; 
    } 
   } 
   if(isInSafeBrowsing(md5($link . "/"))) 
    return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]*100; 
  } 
   
  return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
 } 
 else 
  return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
} 
 
// Searches Twitter for the full URL and, if it is not found, the domain used  
// in the URL to see if it is being shared there.  
// The idea is that popular links and well-known domains should appear in  
// Twitter search results. Malicious or obscure sites should not appear in  
// Twitter search results. 
// Returns: GOOD_SCORE*2 if the full link appears on Twitter 
//  GOOD_SCORE if the domain used in the link appears on Twitter  
//   (i.e. rit.edu) 
//  BAD_SCORE if neither the full link or domain appears on Twitter 
// Notes: This function relies on Twitter's malicious URL filtering. The  
//  effectiveness of this function, however, depends on the  
//  effectiveness of these filters since a malicious link that is not  
//  filtered by Twitter will receive a good score for this test. 
function twitterSearch($link) { 
 // Setup a cURL instance to search, using the Twitter API, for the  
// entire URL 
 $ch = curl_init("http://search.twitter.com/search.json?q=" . $link); 
 // Including a unique User Agent allows us to send more queries per  
// hour per [33] 
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 curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_USERAGENT, "Linkchecker/1.0  
(http://apps.facebook.com/linkchecker)");  
 // Return the results as an associative array, rather than printing  
// them to stdout 
 curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true); 
  
 // Execute the search 
 $response = curl_exec($ch); 
  
 // True if the search failed 
 if(!$response) { 
  curl_close($ch); 
  return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
 } 
  
 // Decode the JSON results into something we can parse with PHP 
 $results = json_decode($response); 
 
 // Loop through the search results 
 foreach($results->results as $result) { 
  // Return GOOD_SCORE*2 if the entire URL was found on Twitter 
  if($result->text != "") { 
   curl_close($ch); 
   return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]*2; 
  } 
 } 
  
 // Search for an IP address in the URL 
 // Regex adapted from [20] 
 $result = preg_match("/\b(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}\b/", $link, $matches); 
 if($result) { 
  // True if the URL contains an IP address--we should not score  
// this since it would be a false alarm 
  if(isset($matches[0])) 
   return $GLOBALS["NO_SCORE"]; 
 } 
  
  
 // If we get here, the entire URL was not found on Twitter so we search  
// for the domain instead 
 $hostname = parse_url($link); 
  
 // Necessary for URLs without a scheme (i.e. http://), parse_url does  
// not work correctly and stores host in ["path"] 
 if(isset($hostname["host"]))  
  $hostnameExp = explode(".", $hostname["host"]); 
 else { 
  $link = "http://" . $link; 
  $hostname = parse_url($link); 
  $hostnameExp = explode(".", $hostname["host"]); 
 } 
   
 // Get the main domain and TLD of the link (i.e. rit.edu) 
 $hostSize = count($hostnameExp); 
 $hostname = $hostnameExp[$hostSize-2] . "." .  
$hostnameExp[$hostSize-1]; 
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 // Search Twitter for the domain this time 
 curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL,  
"http://search.twitter.com/search.json?q=" . $hostname); 
 $response = curl_exec($ch); 
  
 // Decode the JSON results into something we can parse with PHP 
 $results = json_decode($response); 
  
 // Loop through the search results 
 foreach($results->results as $result) { 
  // Return GOOD_SCORE if the domain was found on Twitter 
  if($result->text != "") { 
   curl_close($ch); 
   return $GLOBALS["GOOD_SCORE"]; 
  } 
 } 
  
 // Return BAD_SCORE if neither the URL or domain were found 
 curl_close($ch); 
 return $GLOBALS["BAD_SCORE"]; 
} 
 
?> 
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E 
Source Code – manual-scan.php 
 
<?php 
/* Author: Mike Robertson 
* Application: Link Checker 
* File: 'manual-scan.php'  
*   A manual interface for the URL scanner. This page allows the user to pass  
* URLs to the scanner without requiring that they be posted to the user's  
* stream. This makes it easier to scan a large list of links or links  
* that otherwise be filtered out of the user's stream.  
* 
* The user is asked to provide a list of links (1 per line) and to  
* specify the sender (either by selecting from a list of their 
* friends or entering the sender's Facebook user ID. 
* 
*  Note: The user must have run at least 1 automatic scan to develop some  
*  of the heuristics, such as contact frequency and trusted 
*  lists, which are required for the scans. 
* 
* This file is part of Link Checker. 
* 
*    Link Checker is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 
*    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
*    the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 
*    (at your option) any later version. 
* 
*    Link Checker is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
*    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
*    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
*    GNU General Public License for more details. 
* 
*    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
*    along with Link Checker.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
*/ 
 
$api = $app_dir . 'api/facebook.php'; 
require_once $api;    // Facebook API 
include 'scanner.php';    // Used to start the scans 
$conf = $app_dir . 'linkchecker.conf'; 
include '/data/www/linkchecker.conf'; // The global configuration file 
 
// Initalize an array of links to scan 
$links = array(); 
 
// Expands shortened URLs using the Long URL Please API [9]  
// Returns: The expanded URL string if the URL was shortened 
//  false if the URL was not shortened 
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function expandURL($url) { 
 // Pattern adapted from Long URL Please Firefox extension [10]  
 // We will only try to shorten the link if it matches the same pattern  
// used by the Long URL Please service (these are supported services) 
 // This saves on the number of requests we need to make to their API 
 $pattern =  
"/(http(s?):\/\/(307\.to|adjix\.com|b23\.ru|bacn\.me|bit\.ly|bloa 
t\.me|budurl\.com|cli\.gs|clipurl\.us|cort\.as|digg\.com|dwarfurl
\.com|fb\.me|ff\.im|fff\.to|href\.in|idek\.net|is\.gd|j\.mp|kl\.a
m|korta\.nu|lin\.cr|ln\-
s\.net|loopt\.us|lost\.in|memurl\.com|merky\.de|migre\.me|moourl\
.com|nanourl\.se|om\.ly|ow\.ly|peaurl\.com|ping\.fm|piurl\.com|pl
url\.me|pnt\.me|poprl\.com|post\.ly|rde\.me|reallytinyurl\.com|re
dir\.ec|retwt\.me|rubyurl\.com|short\.ie|short\.to|smallr\.com|sn
\.im|sn\.vc|snipr\.com|snipurl\.com|snurl\.com|su\.pr|tiny\.cc|ti
nysong\.com|tinyurl\.com|togoto\.us|tr\.im|tra\.kz|trg\.li|twurl\
.cc|twurl\.nl|u\.mavrev\.com|u\.nu|ur1\.ca|url\.az|url\.ie|urlx\.
ie|w34\.us|xrl\.us|yep\.it|zi\.ma|zurl\.ws)\/[a-zA-Z0-9_-
]+)|((http(s?):\/\/[a-zA-Z0-9_-
]+\.notlong\.com)|(http(s?):\/\/[a-zA-Z0-9_-
]+\.qlnk\.net)|(http(s?):\/\/chilp\.it\/[?][a-zA-Z0-9_-]+) 
|(http(s?):\/\/goo\.gl\/fb\/[a-zA-Z0-9_-
]+)|(http(s?):\/\/trim\.li\/nk\/[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+) 
  |(http(s?):\/\/url4\.eu\/[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+))[\/]?/"; 
   
 $num = preg_match_all($pattern, $url, $matches); 
 // True if the URL matches a pattern supported by Long URL Please 
 if($num > 0) { 
  $matches = $matches[0]; 
  foreach($matches as $match) { 
   // Setup a cURL instance to shorten the URL using the Long  
// URL Please API 
   $ch = curl_init("http://www.longurlplease.com/api/v1.1?q="  
. $url); 
   // Return the results as an associative array, rather than  
// printing them to stdout 
   curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true); 
    
   // Execute the API call 
   $response = curl_exec($ch); 
    
   // Decode the JSON results into something to parse w/ PHP 
   $results = json_decode($response); 
    
   // Return the full URL 
   return $results->$url; 
  } 
 } 
  
 // Return false if the URL was not shortened 
 return false; 
} 
 
// Checks links[] to see if a given link already exists in it 
// to avoid scanning the same link twice. 
// A link is considered a duplicate if its hash exists > 1 time 
// in a single post. 
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// Returns: 1 if the link is a duplicate 
//   0 if the link is not a duplicate 
function checkForDupe($hash, $postID) { 
 $GLOBALS["links"]; 
  
 foreach($GLOBALS["links"] as $link) { 
  // Use 'true' to enable strict checking mode 
  // This is needed when the array can contain a 0--this might  
// cause in_array to return true 
  $hasHash = in_array($hash, $link, true); 
 
  if($hasHash) { 
   // Use 'true' to enable strict checking mode 
   // This is needed when the array can contain a 0--this  
// might cause in_array to return true 
   $hasPost = in_array($postID, $link, true); 
   if($hasPost)  
    return 1; 
   else 
    continue; 
  } 
  else 
   continue; 
 } 
 return 0; 
} 
 
 
// True if the user has filled out and submitted the scan form, so we can 
begin the scan now 
if(isset($_POST["start_scan"]) && $_POST["start_scan"] == 1) {  
 // Set the variables that will be passed to the scanner 
 $user_id = $_POST["user"]; 
 $numFriends = $_POST["numFriends"]; 
 $author = $_POST["friends"]; 
  
 if(isset($_POST["senderID"])) { 
  if($_POST["senderID"] != "") { 
   if (is_numeric($_POST["senderID"]) &&  
strlen($_POST["senderID"]) <= 32) 
    $author = $_POST["senderID"]; 
   else  
    echo "<script>alert('Invalid Sender ID specified.  
Starting over...');  
window.location.href=window.location.href;</scr
ipt>"; 
  } 
 } 
  
 // Build the links array to be scanned by regex searching the list  
// provided by the user 
 $pattern = "/\b(http:\/\/|https:\/\/|www\.)(?:[a-zA-Z0-9\- 
])+(@|\.){1}[a-zA-Z0-9\-]+(?:\/?[a-zA-Z0-9\$\-
_\.\+!\*'\(\,):@=&\?])*\b/"; 
 $num = preg_match_all($pattern, $_POST["urllist"], $matches); 
 if($num > 0) { 
  $matches = $matches[0]; 
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  // Loop through the URLs found by the regex search 
  foreach($matches as $match) { 
   // Enable for debugging only 
   //echo "Message: " . $match . "<br />"; 
    
   // Expand the URL if it is shortened 
   $result = expandURL($match); 
   if($result != false) 
    $match = $result; 
    
   // Check to see if the link is a duplicate 
   $isDupe = checkForDupe(md5($match), 0); 
    
   // Enable for debugging only 
   //echo "Is Duplicate: " . $isDupe . "<br /><br />"; 
    
   // If the link is not a duplicate, add it to the links  
// array to be scanned 
   if($isDupe == 0) 
    // Array: [0] => URL hash, [1] => URL, [2] =>  
// author's user ID, [3] => post ID, [4] => score 
    $links[] = array(md5($match), $match, $author, 0, 0); 
  } 
 } 
  
 // Carry over the user's session for API calls  
 $facebook = new Facebook($appapikey, $appsecret); 
 $facebook->set_user($user_id, $_POST["sKey"]); 
  
 // Connect to the database and select the linkchecker database. 
 // Variables are accessed from the global config file 
 $result = mysql_connect($server, $username, $password); 
 if(!$result) 
  die("Could not connect to database."); 
 $result = mysql_select_db($contact_database); 
 if(!$result) 
  die("Could not open contact_database."); 
  
 // Get the total contact frequency we have seen 
 $query = "SELECT SUM(contactCount) AS numContacts FROM contacts_" .  
$user_id; 
 $response = mysql_query($query); 
 $result = mysql_fetch_assoc($response); 
 $numContacts = -1; 
 if(isset($result["numContacts"])) 
  $numContacts = $result["numContacts"]; 
  
 // If there are any links to scan, start the scanner 
 if(count($links) > 0) 
  startScanner($user_id, $numFriends, $links, $facebook,  
$numContacts); 
   
 mysql_close(); 
} 
 
// True if this is the user's first visit to the page and they have not 
submitted the form yet 
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else { 
 // Initialize the Facebook object for API calls  
 $facebook = new Facebook($appapikey, $appsecret); 
 
 // Get the user's Facebook ID and the number of friends 
 $user_id = $facebook->require_login(); 
 $sKey = $facebook->api_client->session_key; 
 $friends = $facebook->api_client->friends_get(); 
 $numFriends = count($friends); 
 
 // Users must run at least 1 automatic scan to build some of the  
// heuristics first 
 echo "<p>Please make sure you have run at least one automatic scan  
(http://apps.facebook.com/linkchecker) before running the manual 
scan.</p>"; 
 // Build the form. The hidden field is used to determine when the user  
// submits the form and the scan can begin. 
 echo "<form action=\"manual-scan.php\" method=\"post\"><input  
type=\"hidden\" name=\"start_scan\" value=\"1\" /><input 
type=\"hidden\" name=\"sKey\" value=\"" . $sKey. "\" />"; 
 echo "User ID: <input type=\"text\" name=\"user\" value=\"" . $user_id  
. "\" readonly /><br />"; 
 echo "Friends: <input type=\"text\" name=\"numFriends\" value=\"" .  
$numFriends . "\" readonly /><br /><br />"; 
 echo "Enter the URLs to scan (one URL per line):<br />"; 
 echo "<textarea name=\"urllist\" rows=\"10\" cols=\"60\"></textarea><br  
/>"; 
 echo "Sender: <select id=\"friends\" name=\"friends\"><option  
value=\"0\"></option>"; 
 
 // Build a drop-down menu of the user's friends to choose as the sender 
 if(is_array($friends)) { 
  $uids = ""; 
  $counter = 0; 
  foreach($friends as $friend) { 
   if($counter == 0) { 
    $uids = $friend; 
    $counter++; 
    continue; 
   } 
   $uids.=", " . $friend; 
   $counter++; 
  } 
  $name = $facebook->api_client->users_getInfo($uids,"last_name,  
first_name"); 
  $counter = 0; 
  foreach($friends as $friend) { 
   echo "<option value=\"" . $friend . "\">"  .  
$name[$counter]["first_name"] . " " . 
$name[$counter]["last_name"] . "</option>"; 
   $counter++; 
  } 
 } 
 else { 
  echo "<option>Unable to load friends</option>"; 
  echo "<script>document.getElementById('friends').disabled=true; 
</script>"; 
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 } 
  
 // The user can also enter a Facebook user ID of the sender if they are  
// not in their friend list 
 echo "</select><br />Or...<br />"; 
 echo "Sender ID: <input type=\"text\" name=\"senderID\"  
maxlength=\"32\" /><br />"; 
 echo "<input type=\"submit\" name=\"submit\" value=\"Submit\"  
/></form>"; 
} 
 
exit(0); 
 
?> 
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F 
linkchecker.conf 
 
/* Author: Mike Robertson 
* Application: Link Checker 
* File: 'linkchecker.conf'  
*   A file containing some of the global configuration options for the  
* application. 
*/ 
 
<?php 
 
$appapikey = '0';      // Facebook API Key – Request from Facebook5 
$appsecret = '0';      // Facebook Application Secret - request from Facebook1 
$server = "localhost"; // MySQL Server (in relation to the web server) 
$contact_database = "linkchecker"; // Name of the database that stores  
// contact counts 
$sb_database = "safebrowsing";  // Name of the database that stores  
// Google Safe Browsing data 
$username = "linkchecker";  // MySQL username for Link Checker  
$password = "linkchecker";  // MySQL password for the Link Checker 
$report_dir = "/data/www/results/"; // The local directory where reports will  
// be stored 
 
$GOOD_SCORE = 1;  // score to add if the test returns a positive result 
$BAD_SCORE = -1;  // score to add if the test returns a negative result 
$NO_SCORE = 0;  // score to add if the test returns an inconclusive result 
 
// ISO 3166 Country Codes of untrusted countries 
// Based on data from [4] 
$untrustedCountries = array("CN", "RU", "CA", "IR", "MN", "ES", "GB", "CZ",  
"UA", "RO", "BG", "BD", "TH", "VN", "MY", "ID",  
"KR"); 
 
?> 
  
                                                          
5
 http://developers.facebook.com/ 
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G 
Source Code – sb-black-updates.sh 
 
#!/bin/bash 
 
# Copyright 2010 Michael Robertson 
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 
# (at your option) any later version. 
# 
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
# GNU General Public License for more details. 
# 
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
# along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
 
# Database username 
USER="googlesb" 
# Database name 
DATABASE="safebrowsing" 
# Safe Browsing API key – request from [12] 
APIKEY="0" 
 
# Get the current blacklist version that is in the database 
RESULT=`mysql -u $USER < getcurrentver.sql` 
BLACKVER=`echo $RESULT | cut -d" " -f2` 
 
# Loop until the script is killed (new check every 30 minutes) 
while true 
do 
 
# Loop until we get a successful response from Google 
SUCCESS=0 
while [ $SUCCESS -eq 0 ] 
do 
 # Logging message 
 echo "`date` sb-updates: Attempting to update blacklist from  
sb.google.com" >> /var/log/messages 
  
 # Get the next available version of the blacklist 
 wget -O black\:1\:$BLACKVER  
"http://sb.google.com/safebrowsing/update?client=api&apikey=$APIK
EY&version=goog-black-hash:1:$BLACKVER" 2> /tmp/black-result.tmp 
  
 # Make sure we got a good response from Google 
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 SUCCESS=`cat /tmp/black-result.tmp | grep -c "200 OK"` 
 # True if the request was a success 
 if [ $SUCCESS -eq 1 ] 
 then 
  # Reset the error counter 
  echo 0 > black-errors 
   
  # Get the new blacklist version number 
  BLACKHEADER=`cat black\:1\:$BLACKVER | head -n 1` 
  NEWBLACK=`echo $BLACKHEADER | cut -d" " -f2 | cut -d"." -f2 |  
cut -d"]" -f1` 
  if [ -z $NEWBLACK ] 
  then 
   NEWBLACK=$BLACKVER 
  fi 
   
  # Check to see if the list sent from Google is just a "diff"  
# update or an entirely new list 
  ISUPDATE=`echo $BLACKHEADER | grep -c update` 
   
  # True if the list is just a "diff" update 
  if [ $ISUPDATE -eq 1 ] 
  then 
   # Get a list of hashes that need to be added to the  
# database (marked with +) 
   cat black\:1\:$BLACKVER | grep + > /tmp/blackadds.tmp 
    
   # Load the new hashes into the database 
   RESULT=`echo "LOAD DATA INFILE '/tmp/blackadds.tmp' IGNORE  
INTO TABLE blacklist_hash FIELDS TERMINATED BY '+' 
(@skip, hash);" | mysql -u $USER $DATABASE` 
    
   # True if the load was successful 
   if [ -z $RESULT ] 
   then  
    # Update the updateTime field for the database 
    CURRENTTIME=`date +"%F %T"` 
    echo "UPDATE updates SET updateTime='$CURRENTTIME',  
version='$NEWBLACK' WHERE id = '1';" | mysql -u 
$USER $DATABASE  
    
   # True if the load was unsuccessful 
   else 
    # Log an error 
    echo "`date` sb-updates: Failed to update  
blacklist_hash database" >> /var/log/messages  
   fi 
    
   # Get a list of hashes that need to be removed from the  
# database (marked with -) 
   cat black\:1\:$BLACKVER | grep - > /tmp/blacksubs.tmp 
    
   # Delete the hashes from the database 
   while read LINE 
   do 
    HASH=`echo $LINE | cut -d"+" -f2` 
    echo "DELETE FROM blacklist_hash WHERE hash =  
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'$HASH';" | mysql -u $USER $DATABASE  
   done < /tmp/blacksubs.tmp 
    
  # True if the list is an entirely new list 
  else 
   # Get a list of hashes to add (all of them since it is a  
# new list) 
   cat black\:1\:$BLACKVER | grep + > /tmp/blackadds.tmp  
    
   # Drop the old database and recreate it 
   RESULT=`mysql -u $USER < recreate-black-hash.sql` 
    
   # True if the database was successfully recreated 
   if [ -z $RESULT ] 
   then 
    # Load the new hashes into the database 
    RESULT=`echo "LOAD DATA INFILE '/tmp/blackadds.tmp'  
IGNORE INTO TABLE blacklist_hash FIELDS 
TERMINATED BY '+' (@skip, hash);" | mysql -u 
$USER $DATABASE` 
                          
       # True if the load was succesful 
       if [ -z $RESULT ] 
                           then 
        # Update the updateTime field  
# for the database 
                                   CURRENTTIME=`date +"%F %T"` 
                                   echo "UPDATE updates SET  
updateTime='$CURRENTTIM
E', version='$NEWBLACK' 
WHERE id = '1';" | 
mysql -u $USER 
$DATABASE 
       # True if the load failed 
       else 
       # Log an error message 
                                  echo "`date` sb-updates: Failed to  
update blacklist_hash 
database" >> 
/var/log/messages 
                           fi 
    
   # True if the database could not be recreated 
   else 
    # Log an error message 
    echo "`date` sb-updates: Failed to recreate the  
blacklist_hash database" >> /var/log/messages 
   fi   
  fi  
  # Break out of the loop so we can sleep for 30 minutes 
  break 1  
  
 # True if Google sent an error 
 else 
  # Keep track of the number of sequential errors received so far 
  ERRORS=`cat black-errors` 
  let PLUSONE=$ERRORS+1 
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  echo $PLUSONE > black-errors 
   
  # Backoff algorithm per the API usage documentation 
  if [ $ERRORS -lt 2 ] 
  then 
   SUCCESS=0 
   echo "`date` sb-updates: Failed to get new blacklist from  
sb.google.com. Backing off for 60 seconds" >> 
/var/log/messages 
   sleep 60 
  elif [ $ERRORS -lt 3 ] 
  then 
   SUCCESS=0 
   echo "`date` sb-updates: Failed to get new blacklist from  
sb.google.com. Backing off for 60 minutes" >> 
/var/log/messages 
   sleep 3600 
  elif [ $ERRORS -lt 4 ] 
  then 
   SUCCESS=0 
   echo "`date` sb-updates: Failed to get new blacklist from  
sb.google.com. Backing off for 180 minutes" >> 
/var/log/messages 
   sleep 10800 
  else 
   SUCCESS=0 
   echo "`date` sb-updates: Failed to get new blacklist from  
sb.google.com. Backing off for 360 minutes" >>  
/var/log/messages 
   sleep 21600 
  fi 
 fi    
done 
 
# Reset the successful update counter for the next try 
SUCCESS=0 
 
# Remove the temporary files  
rm -f /tmp/black-result.tmp 
rm -f /tmp/blackadds.tmp 
rm -f /tmp/blacksubs.tmp 
 
# Sleep for 30 minutes before updating again 
sleep 1800  
 
done 
exit 
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H 
Source Code – sb-malware-updates.sh 
 
#!/bin/bash 
 
# Copyright 2010 Michael Robertson 
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify 
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or 
# (at your option) any later version. 
# 
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
# GNU General Public License for more details. 
# 
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
# along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
 
# Database username 
USER="googlesb" 
# Database name 
DATABASE="safebrowsing" 
# Safe Browsing API key – request from [12] 
APIKEY="0" 
 
# Get the current malware list version that is in the database 
RESULT=`mysql -u $USER < getcurrentver.sql` 
MALVER=`echo $RESULT | cut -d" " -f3` 
 
# Loop until the script is killed (new check every 30 minutes) 
while true 
do 
 
# Loop until we get a successful response from  
SUCCESS=0 
while [ $SUCCESS -eq 0 ] 
do 
 # Logging message 
 echo "`date` sb-updates: Attempting to update malware list from  
sb.google.com" >> /var/log/messages 
  
# Get the next available version of the malware list 
 wget -O malware\:1\:$MALVER  
"http://sb.google.com/safebrowsing/update?client=api&apikey=$APIK
EY&version=goog-malware-hash:1:$MALVER" 2> /tmp/malware-
result.tmp 
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# Make sure we got a good response from Google 
 SUCCESS=`cat /tmp/malware-result.tmp | grep -c "200 OK"` 
  
# True if the request was a success 
 if [ $SUCCESS -eq 1 ] 
 then 
  # Reset the error counter 
  echo 0 > malware-errors 
 
  # Get the new malware list version number 
  MALHEADER=`cat malware\:1\:$MALVER | head -n 1` 
  NEWMAL=`echo $MALHEADER | cut -d" " -f2 | cut -d"." -f2 |  
cut -d"]" -f1` 
  if [ -z $NEWMAL ] 
                then 
                        NEWMAL=$MALVER 
                fi 
   
# Check to see if the list sent from Google is just a "diff"  
# update or an entirely new list 
  ISUPDATE=`echo $MALHEADER | grep -c update` 
   
# True if the list is just a "diff" update 
  if [ $ISUPDATE -eq 1 ] 
  then 
   # Get a list of hashes that need to be added to the  
# database (marked with +) 
   cat malware\:1\:$MALVER | grep + > /tmp/malwareadds.tmp 
    
# Load the new hashes into the database 
   RESULT=`echo "LOAD DATA INFILE '/tmp/malwareadds.tmp'  
IGNORE INTO TABLE malware_hash FIELDS TERMINATED BY 
'+' (@skip, hash);" | mysql -u $USER $DATABASE` 
    
# True if the load was successful 
   if [ -z $RESULT ] 
   then 
    # Update the updateTime field for the database 
    CURRENTTIME=`date +"%F %T"` 
    echo "UPDATE updates SET updateTime='$CURRENTTIME',  
version='$NEWMAL' WHERE id = '2';" | mysql -u 
$USER $DATABASE  
 
   # True if the load was unsuccessful 
   else 
    # Log an error 
    echo "`date` sb-updates: Failed to update  
malware_hash database" >> /var/log/messages  
   fi 
    
# Get a list of hashes that need to be removed from the  
# database (marked with -) 
   cat malware\:1\:$MALVER | grep - > /tmp/malwaresubs.tmp 
    
# Delete the hashes from the database 
   while read LINE 
   do 
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    HASH=`echo $LINE | cut -d"+" -f2` 
    echo "DELETE FROM malware_hash WHERE hash = '$HASH';"  
| mysql -u $USER $DATABASE  
   done < /tmp/malwaresubs.tmp 
   
# True if the list is an entirely new list 
  else 
   # Get a list of hashes to add (all of them since it is a  
# new list) 
   cat malware\:1\:$MALVER | grep + > /tmp/malwareadds.tmp  
    
# Drop the old database and recreate it 
   RESULT=`mysql -u $USER < recreate-malware-hash.sql` 
    
# True if the database was successfully recreated 
   if [ -z $RESULT ] 
   then 
    # Load the new hashes into the database 
    RESULT=`echo "LOAD DATA INFILE '/tmp/malwareadds.tmp'  
IGNORE INTO TABLE malware_hash FIELDS 
TERMINATED BY '+' (@skip, hash);" | mysql -u 
$USER $DATABASE` 
      
# True if the load was successful 
                         if [ -z $RESULT ] 
                         then 
      # Update the updateTime field for the  
# database 
                                 CURRENTTIME=`date +"%F %T"` 
                                 echo "UPDATE updates SET  
updateTime='$CURRENTTIME', 
version='$NEWMAL' WHERE id = '2';" 
| mysql -u $USER $DATABASE 
        
# True if the load failed 
     else 
      # Log an error message 
                                 echo "`date` sb-updates: Failed to update  
malware_hash database" >> 
/var/log/messages 
                         fi 
     
# True if the database could not be recreated 
   else 
    # Log an error message 
    echo "`date` sb-updates: Failed to recreate the  
malware_hash database" >> /var/log/messages 
   fi   
  fi 
  
  # Break out of the loop so we canc sleep for 30 minutes 
  break 1  
  
# True if Google sent an error 
 else 
  # Keep track of the number of sequential errors received so far 
  ERRORS=`cat malware-errors` 
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  let PLUSONE=$ERRORS+1 
  echo $PLUSONE > malware-errors 
 
  # Backoff algorithm per the API usage documentation 
  if [ $ERRORS -lt 2 ] 
  then 
   SUCCESS=0 
   echo "`date` sb-updates: Failed to get new malware list  
from sb.google.com. Backing off for 60 seconds" >> 
/var/log/messages 
   sleep 60 
  elif [ $ERRORS -lt 3 ] 
  then 
   SUCCESS=0 
   echo "`date` sb-updates: Failed to get new malware list  
from sb.google.com. Backing off for 60 minutes" >> 
/var/log/messages 
   sleep 3600 
  elif [ $ERRORS -lt 4 ] 
  then 
   SUCCESS=0 
   echo "`date` sb-updates: Failed to get new malware list  
from sb.google.com. Backing off for 180 minutes" >> 
/var/log/messages 
   sleep 10800 
  else 
   SUCCESS=0 
   echo "`date` sb-updates: Failed to get new malware list  
from sb.google.com. Backing off for 360 minutes" >> 
/var/log/messages 
   sleep 21600 
  fi 
 fi    
done 
 
# Reset the successful update counter for the next try 
SUCCESS=0 
 
# Remove the temporary files 
rm -f /tmp/malware-result.tmp 
rm -f /tmp/malwareadds.tmp 
rm -f /tmp/malwaresubs.tmp 
 
# Sleep for 30 minutes before updating again 
sleep 1800  
 
done 
exit 
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I 
Test Data Set – Safe URLs 
 
The following table contains the safe URLs portion of the test data set used with the manual scan tests 
described in Section 3.3. This data is a subset of the test data used by Robichaux and Ganger in their 
2006 study of anti-phishing software [34]. 
 
http://fotolog.terra.com/ 
http://www.flogao.com.br/gatasdeksa 
http://music.kapook.com/newrelease2.shtml 
http://blueyspoker.easycash.com.au/p1.asp 
http://bluewin.ch/ 
http://www.caf.fr/SimuLog.htm 
http://www.friday-ad.co.uk/FullAdDetails.asp 
http://www.satsw.net/ 
http://www.devochki.ru/showanketbynum.php 
http://list4.auctions.yahoo.co.jp/jp/2084057161-categoryleaf.html 
http://windowsmedia.com/Shop/FindAlbums.asp 
http://www4.climatempo.com.br/climatempo/cep.php 
http://board.n-age.in.th/forum_topics.asp 
http://212.174.200.74/AirDev/login/loginIndex.jsp 
http://aovivo.noticias.terra.com.br/noticias/aovivo/index2.htm 
http://www.littlewoods-online.com/rf/navigation/home/index.do 
http://www.publicanary.com/cristal/versos_tristes.htm 
http://www.flyloco.de/DE 
http://www.silver-world.net/auberge.php 
http://www.poemasromancesyamor.com/principal.html 
http://elearning.uws.edu.au/webct/ticket/ticketLogin 
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http://services.orange.co.th/ringtone/sounddemo.asp 
http://lotteries.olgc.ca/consumer_wn_ct.jsp 
http://www.ittakes2.com/login.php 
http://www.mochisonline.com/foros/search.php 
http://www.ancestry.com/s12955/t5299/landing/rd.ashx 
http://www.bingobilly.com/ 
http://www.fife.gov.uk/themes/index.cfm 
http://www.winantiviruspro.com/landingpage/wavpro_4in1.php 
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/publicaccess/partylist.asp 
http://www.neti.ee/cgi-bin/teema/HARIDUS_JA_KULTUUR/Haridus/ 
http://www.mariasearch.com/XML/index.php 
http://hk.f522.mail.yahoo.com/ym/login 
http://psc.disney.go.com/disneychannel/theproudfamily/games/musicvideo/index.html 
http://fr.barbie.com/activities/games/softwared/2003/ 
http://clearstation.etrade.com/ 
http://ar.f331.mail.yahoo.com/ym/login 
http://6arab.com/singers-ar/north/keffori/index-ar.shtml 
http://www.compusa.com/default.asp 
http://www.internacional.com.br/ 
http://www.mtv.com/onair/dyn/realworld-season16/series.jhtml 
http://www.uh.edu/ 
http://www.tarjetasvirtuales.com/pe_es/ 
http://randki.o2.pl/ 
http://hub.benl.ebay.be/buy 
http://www.aussiematchmaker.com.au/Default.aspx 
http://www.lagrange-holidays.com/home.php3 
http://www.portalcanoas.net/principal.asp 
http://www.q8me.com/ 
http://www.zecheval.com/banque.php 
Table I.1: Safe URL Test Data 
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Test Data Set – Malicious URLs 
 
The following table contains the malicious URLs portion of the test data set used with the manual scan 
tests described in Section 3.3. This data is a random subset of data published by PhishTank and Malware 
Patrol [8, 31]. These links should not be opened in a web browser, since they likely contain malicious 
software or phishing scams. 
 
http://wow.worldofwarcraft.com.zuoya.info/ 
http://yahoo08.t35.com/login.htm 
http://get-doubled.tk/ 
http://www.facebook72.0fees.net/ 
http://zyngafanwinner.tk/ 
http://tboe-dvdrip-axxo.tk/ 
http://r123321.justfree.com/rs2/index2.php 
http://www.orkuteiros.tk/ 
http://www.confeccionespanda.com/Logon.html 
http://crm.mihnati.com/export/connexion/ 
http://74.208.109.36/facebook/ 
http://www.hgsc.gov.cn/postinfo1.html 
http://xmandesign.com/media/formslogin.php 
http://bunonline.com/abon/1.php?logon=myposte 
http://santander-updates.com/ 
http://whtrainingaccount18.com/search.php 
http://thelloydzinternet.com/ 
http://www.michaelsfence.com/p7pm/ 
http://www.5kant.ch/texte/ 
http://kaakibat2001.com/cgi-bin/IBlogin.php 
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http://www.worldofwarcrxaft-login.com/ 
http://64.22.67.45/~lk/online.hmrc.gov.uk/ 
http://www.amon.up.am/Confirm.htm 
http://www.email-upgrade.us.ms/ 
http://www.hamptonhaddon.com/paypal.com 
http://wywg.bianyaoyang.cn 
http://appline.ieguide.co.kr 
http://onsearch.co.kr 
http://wywg.bbhhsp.cn 
http://downlopaginvisualiz.com.sapo.pt 
http://wywg.5207628.cn 
http://cd-baidu.com.cn 
http://wywg.bjyax.cn 
http://rs47cg2.rapidshare.com 
http://blogaofotos8.com.sapo.pt 
http://wywg.xh-violet.com.cn 
http://wywg.youyou365.cn 
http://gmblog04.fileave.com 
http://total.zerodoctor.com 
http://wywg.go162.cn 
http://uploaded.100free.com 
http://wywg.hs1718.cn 
http://komplex2.psyradio.org 
http://wywg.gmjdsb.cn 
http://wywg.huruoqi.cn 
http://77.245.61.232 
http://microsofj.com:88 
http://ipod.imglobal.net 
http://wywg.syzst.com.cn 
http://nt1oo.8866.org:8866 
Table J.1: Malicious URL Test Data 
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K 
Request for Comments – Twitter 
 
The following request was sent to Twitter on March 25, 2010 via their inquiry form6: 
 
To whom it may concern, 
I am currently a graduate student at the Rochester Institute of Technology and as part of my MS 
thesis I am researching the spread of malicious web content through social sites like Twitter. I 
know that you have recently started filtering users from posting URLs that are known to be 
malicious, but I was wondering if you publish any information on how this filtering is actually 
accomplished (i.e. static blacklists or dynamic heuristics)? Also, I am curious about whether or 
not you have the ability to retroactively remove or block links which made it through the filters 
but were later found to be malicious? Finally, do you have a strategy to deal with shortened URLs 
that could potentially avoid the filters?  
 
Any information that you can provide would be extremely helpful for my research. Thanks in 
advance for your time and consideration. 
 
Regards, 
 
Michael Robertson 
Rochester Institute of Technology 
[Contact information removed] 
 
Within minutes of submitting the form, the following reply was received via email: 
Hi , 
                                                          
6
 http://twitter.com/help/contact/make_press_inquiry 
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Thanks for your note. At the moment, we are not making our user statistics public. There are, 
however, several third party websites that make estimations of the number of twitter users, both 
in the U.S. and internationally. You may find useful information on those sites, since we cannot 
offer you this information. 
 
You may also want to follow our @Twitter account for regular company updates, and read our 
blog for more in-depth information. We appreciate your interest in the company, and thanks for 
reaching out to us. 
 
Thanks, 
Twitter Communications Team 
 
As of the time of this writing, no further response has been received from Twitter. Unfortunately, no 
detailed technical information could found on their website related to their URL filtering technology. 
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L 
Request for Comments – Facebook 
 
The following request was sent to Facebook on March 25, 2010 via email: 
 
from Michael Robertson 
to press@facebook.com 
date Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 2:41 PM 
subject Request for information about URL filtering 
 
To whom it may concern, 
 
I am currently a graduate student at the Rochester Institute of Technology and as part of my MS 
thesis I am researching the spread of malicious web content through social sites like Facebook. I 
know that you have recently started filtering users from posting URLs that are known to be 
malicious, but I was wondering if you publish any information on how this filtering is actually 
accomplished (i.e. static blacklists or dynamic heuristics)? Also, I am curious about whether or 
not you have the ability to retroactively remove or block links which made it through the filters 
but were later found to be malicious? Finally, do you have a strategy to deal with shortened URLs 
that could potentially avoid the filters? 
 
Any information that you can provide would be extremely helpful for my research. Thanks in 
advance for your time and consideration. 
 
Regards, 
 
Michael Robertson 
Rochester Institute of Technology 
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[Contact information removed] 
 
An immediate reply from Facebook followed, also via email: 
from Press <press-noreply@facebook.com> 
to Michael Robertson 
date Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 2:41 PM 
subject Thanks for contacting Facebook 
 
Hello, 
 
Due to a high volume of requests, we are unable to respond to everyone immediately. We 
understand that you may be on deadline and will do our best to respond as quickly as possible. 
We also encourage you to visit our Press Page (www.facebook.com/press.php), where you will 
find general information such as the latest statistics. 
 
If you are not a member of the press, please refer to the below resources and direct your inquiry 
appropriately: 
 
* Help Center (http://www.facebook.com/help.php): If you are a user experiencing a problem 
with the site, or writing in with a suggestion 
 
* http://www.facebook.com/brandpermissions: If you would like to obtain permission to use 
Facebook's trademarks and/or copyrights for commercial and promotional purposes 
 
* http://www.facebook.com/facebook#/press/request.php: If you have a speaking request 
 
* http://www.facebook.com/advertising: If you are interested in advertising on the site 
 
* http://www.facebook.com/sponsorship: If you would like to request Facebook's sponsorship of 
an event 
 
Thanks, 
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The Facebook Corporate Communications Team 
 
As of the time of this writing, no further response has been received from Facebook. Unfortunately, the 
links provided did not yield any detailed technical information about the site’s URL filtering technology. 
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Supplementary File Contents 
 
This section outlines the contents of the supplementary files included with this thesis. 
 
 <ZIP>\Results\ - A directory containing copies of the raw result data obtained during the course 
of this thesis. Personally identifiable information has been sanitized with an “x”.  
 <ZIP>\src\ - A directory containing electronic copies of all the source code listed in this 
Appendix, as well as a copy of the GNU General Public License under which this source code is 
being released. 
 <ZIP>\Test Data\ - A directory containing the test data used by the manual scan. Note that the 
file titled test-data_BAD.txt contains URLs to real-world malicious websites. Please do not visit 
these links in a web browser. 
 <ZIP>\A Social Approach to Security.pdf – An electronic copy of this document. 
 <ZIP>\A Social Approach to Security.pptx – A copy of the defense slides for this thesis. 
 <ZIP>\Application Demo – Automated Scan.mp4 - A video demonstration of the proof-of-
concept application’s automated scan function. 
 <ZIP>\Application Demo – Manual Scan.mp4 - A video demonstration of the proof-of-concept 
application’s manual scan function.
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Application Installation Instructions 
 
The following procedure can be used to install an instance of the Linkchecker application: 
 
1. Install all of the prerequisite applications via their recommended installation procedure. The 
prerequisites that are needed are: 
a. Web Server (i.e. Apache httpd) 
*Note: The WWW root directory should be configured as /data/www/html. If 
another directory is desired, /data/www/html can be linked to the appropriate 
directory. 
b. PHP (5.1.6 or greater recommended) 
i. Must include MySQL support 
c. PEAR 
d. MySQL Client & MySQL Server 
e. jwhois Client 
f. cURL Client 
g. wget Client 
2. If necessary, configure the system’s firewall to allow inbound connections on the port used by 
the web server. In addition, disable SELinux by editing the /etc/sysconfig/selinux file. 
3. Create the /data/www directory, if it does not already exist 
*Note: If it is not desirable to use the /data/www directory to host the application files, 
the user must do a find/replace in each PHP script to adjust any lines configured for 
/data/www with the appropriate directory 
4. Copy the index.php, scanner.php, fb-checks.php, url-checks.php, and manual-scan.php scripts to 
/data/www/html/linkchecker/. These scripts should have permissions of 755. 
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5. Copy linkchecker.conf to /data/www/. This file should have permissions of 640 and belong to 
the same group as the account used by the web server. 
6. Edit the $appapikey and $appsecret variables in linkchecker.conf to reflect the keys registered 
with the Facebook API. 
7. Download a copy of the GeoLite Country database in binary format (GeoIP.dat) from 
http://www.maxmind.com/app/geolitecountry. Copy the database to the /data/www directory 
with permissions of 644. 
8. Create the /data/www/results directory with permissions of 770. This directory should belong to 
the same group as the account used by the web server. 
9. Create the /data/www/api directory.  
10. Download a copy of the Facebook API from http://developers.facebook.com/ and copy it to the 
/data/www/api directory. 
11. Execute the create-db.sql script on the MySQL database to setup the databases. 
12. Copy the getcurrentver.sql, inserthashes-black.sql, inserthashes-malware.sql, recreate-black-
hash.sql, and recreate-malawre-hash.sql scripts to the /root directory. 
13. Copy the sb-black-updates.sh and sb-malware-updates.sh scripts to /root.  
14. Update the APIKEY value in both the sb-black-updates.sh and sb-malware-updates.sh to reflect 
the API key registered with the Google Safe Browsing API. 
15. Execute the sb-black-updates.sh and sb-malware-updates.sh scripts in the background to start 
the Google Safe Browsing update process. These scripts will continue to run and check for 
updates every 30 minutes until they are stopped. 
16. Execute the pear install Net_GeoIP-1.0.0RC3 command to install the Net_GeoIP PHP 
module. This module is necessary for the serverLocation test function. 
17. Update the Facebook Application settings (http://www.facebook.com/#!/developers/) to point 
to the application server. 
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